On Saturday, March 31, the most respected investigative journalist in the Dominican Republic dropped a bomb of evidence linking Senator Félix Bautista's (PLD) construction firms to a host of illegal payments to among others, current President of Haiti, Michell Martelly. Even though the evidence from Nuria seem very convincing, and the whole case in most other countries I know, amounts to a big, international scandal, the local media in the DR, with the exception of acento.com.do has basically ignored the whole thing, and only published the denials of the accused not the details of the case itself. But before I lay out the details of this international scandal, let's look at Félix Bautista.
Félix Bautista is the Senator for PLD for the region San Juan, elected in 2010, and before that he worked for all three of Leonel's administrations. As many anonymous politicians that raise to fame, he worked in construction. During Leonel's first government (1996-2000) Bautista was director of OISOE (or OCOE which it was called then), which is the office of Enginerial Supervision of Public Construction Works. The office signs and gives out contracts for public construction work and oversees these. The office works somehow independently of the Ministry of Public Works. Bautista held the same position from 2004-2010 when he became Senator. As head of OISOE, as Nuria demonstrates, Bautista became a very rich man in a very illegal manner. In 2000 he was a short time in jail due to corruption, and in 2007 he created an institutional crisis when he signed contracts with Sun Land worth 130 million USD. These contracts which implied the state taking up loans for public works would have to pass by Congress, according to the constitution, which they didn't. The contracts were annulled, but the Dominican State lost a lot of money. The case, however, reached the Supreme Court for annulment and to declare the government's actions for unconstitutional. In a weird sentence that had as consequence a strict restriction of judicial review, the Supreme court declared that political parties or congress members could not be interested parties in this case or almost any case of judicial review. On these grounds the case was dismissed. Afterwards most "experts" have argued that this sentence was influenced by the government.
There have been a series of scandals during this campaign. Not surprising most have struck the government, and the presidential ticket of Danilo Medina and Margarita. The more colourful and interesting were the one that Danilo Medina (and Félix Bautista and the technical secretary to the President, Temistocles Montás) had plagiarised their thesis and that Medina never actually finished his Engineering degree in the UASD (Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo). The profesor who made these accusations lost his job (his job was to investigate fraud and plagiarism in the UASD). The other, very interesting, scandal hit the current first lady Margarita Cedeño, when a journalist based in Santiago argued that she (and Félix Bautista) had more than 40 million € in Den Danske Bank. The accusations were false, but have had their effect (I will write more on this later).
The latest scandal, however, is different. First of all it comes from Nuria Piera, one of few investigative journalist in the country, and by far the most known and respected investigative journalists in the country. Second, the evidence for the accusations seem solid (I did not watch her show on Saturday, but all is reported at www.acento.com.do, and the evidence can be found here). Third, they involve a Dominican Senator who happens to be President Leonel Fernández's closest ally, and according to the media a person Leonel considers as is son. Fourth, they also involve the current Haitian president and his opponent Mirlande Manigat in last year's presidential elections. Fifth, the case involves the recent resignation of Prime Minister Gary Conille. And sixth, they demonstrate an attempt to take economic advantage (illegally) of the disastrous Haitian earthquake, which sadly is not unique to this case.
So what is the case: Bautista for some time had been the target of attack by the opposition and their constant accusation of government corruption. Rumours had been spreading that there might be a Dominican angle to the resignation of Gary Conille as Prime Minister of Haiti in February this year. The reason was that Conille had started investigating 8 construction contracts worth $ 385 million that his predecessor Jean Max Bellerive had signed during the course of one day. An auditing committee declared that these contracts were illegal and damaging the Haitian nation, which made Connille start investigations (a move that finally got him removed). The companies that won these contracts were Dominican. For some time Nuria has linked these companies to Félix Bautista either directly, or through straw men (family members of Bautista). Bautista, however, has defended himself saying that it is not illegal to win contracts (in fact 69% of the $500 million the DR government has given for reconstruction in Haiti has gone to Bautista's companies), that all was ok and legal (referring to some vague statements by Conille that could lead to that conclusion). In fact Bautista last Thursday decided to explain himself in the Senate in order to make his defence public, and to get an arena where there would be no critical questions raised given the fact that PLD has 31 of 32 Senators. After his declaration the PLD and the Senate (much the same thing these days) defended Bautista's honour and said that he was the victim of the hardest and most unreasonable attacks that any politician had suffered in the Dominican history (PLD senators would not score very good in a history test of Dominican politics). And then the PLD published a full one page add in most Dominican newspapers whitewashing Bautista and the PLD and attacking the PRD (the title was The 17 lies from the PRD).
The next day, Friday, Bautista went to the Attorney (prosecutor) General (Procurador general in the DR), who is member of the PLD government, a PLD member and former lawyer of Félix Bautista, and asked the Attorney General to investigate the false accusations against him. A couple of days earlier the Attorney General, Radhamés Jiménez, had stated that the accusations were only rumours and speculations, and that he would not act upon them. It is important to remember that in the Dominican political system, the Attorney General is a politician and it has almost never happened that he has started serious investigations against one from his own party/government (see my assessment on horizontal accountability in the Dominican Republic here). If he tries, he would probably be removed or just leave when he sees that it is impossible to work against corruption as Attorney General (such as Hipólito Mejía's first Attorney General, Virgilio Bello Rosa, who resigned in 2002 on this account). The Attorney General has no independence or autonomy, and until relatively recently he was also powerless since the president had to sign off on any legal cases he would like prosecute on in court.
On the Saturday, Nuria threw the bomb. She accused Félix Bautista of two cases of crimes, and she presented hard evidence to substantiate the following: 1) Through the director of the state company INESPRE Ricardo Jacobo, the companies of Félix Bautista paid presidential candidate Michel Martelly more than 2.5 million USD cash, and the other principal candidate Mirlande Marnigat 250.000 USD. This is plain corruption in order to win state contracts in Haiti. However, this particular accusation is probably worse for Martelly than for Bautista, and the Haitian Congress has promised to investigate. 2) Nuria indirectly accuses Bautista for having enriched himself illegally. Pointing out that in the official declarations of his fortune in 1996 (when he became a government bureaucrat) and 2010 (when he became Senator), Bautista declared 547.000 DOP, and 16 million DOP (about 500.000 USD), respectively, and that now Bautista owns appartments in the capital of Santo Domingo worth more than 10 million USD (407 million DOP). Those 10 million USD do not include the value of any of his companies or bank accounts or other real estate. Showing documents of how his companies have won government construction contracts that Bautista himself signed when being head of OISOE, Nuria plainly says (and proves) that Bautista has become rich at the expense of Dominican taxpayers. Nuria also showed how Bautista pays millions of DOP to the PLD and high members of the party, which may come in handy now that he might come under official investigation for corruption.
The case is now officially under investigation in the DR. First of all since Bautista asked the Attorney general to investigate, but also because after Nuria's show there is evidence of corruption. The Attorney General, having this hot potatoe in his hands (either he becomes extremely unpopular with the newspaper-reading population, or he becomes extremely unpopular with his president and loses his job), sent the case to the Department of Anti-corruption, where I am quite confident that they are trying to do whatever they can to get rid of the case without further investigation. The government has remained silent on the issue, which is Leonel's constant tactics when one of his own is accused of corruption, but Nuria reports that government agents are searching high and low for the sources of her story. Nuria plainly says that if it is correct, as Bautista alleges, that the accusations are false, why are the authorities looking for the journalist's sources (and the original documents)?
So what consequences may this scandal have:
Let's first look at Haiti, then the DR.
The first accusation has already become an international scandal, and explains a long way PM Gary Conille's resignation in Haiti in February. Conille wanted to investigate the contracts given to Bautista's companies, Martelly did not, and Conille had to go. And now we have found a plausible explanation for why this was important for Martelly. This has become a headache for Martelly because it is incredibly difficult to find a PM that satisfies donors and the Haitian parliament, where Martelly himself has little support. Furthermore, Martelly definitely will lose goodwill in the donor community over this. And finally, he might actually be impeached for this. The Haitian Parliament has promised to investigate, and Martelly is already in trouble over the issue that he might hold US nationality as well (which would be illegal in Haiti), and he is meeting powerful demands to reinstate the army. This latest case might prove to become the tipping point against him (unless the international community saves him).
Former PM Bellerive who originally signed the contracts, also dragged Leonel into this saying that he had asked the Dominican president for advice on which companies to give the contracts to. Leonel naturally pointed to his friend's companies. Across the border it is now every man for himself. There is no reason to believe the former Haitian PM, who also may come under investigation here, but this scandal may, nevertheless, tarnish President Fernández's otherwise impeccable international image.
Leonel Fernández has managed the most marvellous feat to become extremely popular abroad and only mildly popular at home. Some reasons are that he is smart, knowledgeable, talks English perfectly and he is likeable. In addition, he has been relatively good at running the country. This Bautista case, however, puts in doubt all the good faith and altruistic motives the Fernández government might have had when they decided to construct a new University in Haiti and give 500 million USD for reconstruction. It looks bad for the president that most of these contracts are given to his closest ally, a person he has called his son. His image may also be tarnished even more if the case is not properly investigated, and given the fact that Bautista and Fernández are so close, his image could even become more damaged by a proper investigation.
Danilo Medina might also lose over this. Many now want to hear what Medina's take on this case is. Will he support Bautista? Or, will he criticise and distance himself from him? This is a lose-lose situation. If he supports Bautista, he might lose independent votes and some PLD votes (although maybe not too many given the fact that Mejía is feared by many due to his horrendous four year rule 2000-2004). This might be enough to lose a close election. Should he distance himself from Bautista, Medina might lose more. Bautista is the Organisational Secretary of the PLD, and contributes with millions of DOP to the party. Although still a controversial figure in the party (and for all we know the leaks may come from his own party, which we know is not uncommon in other countries in Latin America), the PLD (and the Senate in particular) has decided to support him. Even though this occurred before the latest evidence was presented, Medina might risk support in his own party if he distances himself from Bautista. And, what is worse, Bautista may pull the plug in San Juan, his home region. If Bautista says to his people not to vote (or to vote for Mejía), this may lose the election for Medina. Bautista does not risk much by doing this since he hold a position in the Senate until 2016 and with his kind of money I am sure he can make friends with Hipólito Mejía as well. Medina, I think, will remain silent and hope not to lose too many votes over this.
How about Bautista? What will happen to him? Well, Bautista is in a better position than Martelly, Fernández and Medina. First of all, he enjoys immunity as Senator until 2016. This may be lifted, but since 30 of the remaining 31 senators belong to his party (which he pays a lot of money) it is very doubtful it ever will be. So, even given a change in government in August 2012, and given the unlikely case that the new Mejía government will actually do something about this, it is not very likely to prosper. Second of all, he is already so rich that he is difficult to touch. Third, as everyone else, he will not go down silently and I am sure he can drag many down with him. That is enough to raise fears into all the three big parties. This case can in fact, end up with a president having to resign in Haiti for corruption, while the Dominican Senator who corrupted him may walk free and enjoy the benefits of a Dominican Congress member.
The positive note is maybe that 10 years ago a case like this would never have reached the media, and even though the DR is still one of the few countries where a scandal like this does not get any traction in the public, I sense that this case is getting some, but not enough, traction. The sad thing, however, is that there exists rich people many of which hereabout are elected politicians, who are willing to steal from the population that elected them and exploit the poorest of the poor that have survived one of the worst natural disasters ever in modern history.
Friday, 6 April 2012
Friday, 30 March 2012
Political cars
Elections will have to wait, now I want to talk about political cars.
Cars are important in this country, both in the cities because they are now built as US cities in which cars are a must (but also due to the heat which makes walking uncomfortable, lack of effective public transportation in the cities, despite the new Metro, and the lack of sidewalks), but also in the rural areas due to distances and other factors. Not only are cars important, but due to the low quality of the roads and a host of other reasons (such as the importance of looking good in your car, social status, road security, and just be bigger than the others), the DR is the country (or at least last time I checked 3 years back) with the highest proportion of SUVs compared to other cars in the world. That is quite impressive for a country that is not among the richest Latin American nations.
This blog posting, however is about political cars, and I will mention three models: The old WV Beetle (Cepillo), BMW (of the early 1980s) and the Toyota Land Rover Prado. All of these cars have gained a bad reputation among the Dominican people.
A curious fact about the DR since the 1960s it has been almost impossible to see the VW Beetle in the streets of the country. This is a surprise for several reasons. First of all the Beetle has been one of the most sold cars worldwide. And another reason is that it has been popular in Latin America since it was rather economical, but also produced in Mexico and Brazil. The reason for the lack of Beetles, or Cepillos, in the DR is that they were used by the notorious secret police SIM (Servicio de Intelegencia Militar) led by the hated and deceiptful Johnny Abbes under the Trujillo regime. The black Beetles would be driven around the cities and towns to spread fear and keep people under tight control by the regime. As in most authoritarian regime, the secret police would find a way to oversee any activity, suspicious or not, and know as many details as possible about as many as possible. After Trujillo was assassined on May 30 1961, his regime and SIM soon fell apart. Since the Beetle was identified and linked to violence, disappearances, and other atrocities, nobody wanted to buy it after Trujillo fell. Therefore, you can only today, as well as earlier, only find a handful of these cars across the country.
BMW is another german brand that is very popular worldwide, although somewhat more luxurious and expensive than the Beetle. And it is due to the price and luxuriousness of this car that it has a special political history in the DR. After 12 years of conservative rule by Joaquín Balaguer, who served as president under the Trujillo regime, the social-democratic opposition party, PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano) won the presidency in 1978 and again in 1982. In 1978 it was Antonio Guzmán who served as president, a man who today is respected for guiding the country through the transition to democracy and for being honest and not corrupt. Other parts of his government, including President Guzmán's daughter, however, were accused of corruption. In 1982 Salvador Jorge Blanco won the presidency for the PRD promising democracy with social justice, and focusing on social redistribution a factor he felt had been neglected under the Guzmán presidency. 1982 (and the 1980s in general), however, was not a good year for Latin America, and the DR soon were facing tough economic battles, which led to several rounds of inflation and devaluation of the Dominican Peso (which some years back had been pegged to the US dollar at 1:1). In midst of an economic crisis (which the government managed quite well, actually), however, many people linked to the government started driving around in fancy new BMWs, and showing off money which the newly rich like to do. The contrast between the economic troubles and the apparent corruption was stark, and the Jorge Blanco government therefore (maybe undeserved) has been remembered as one of the more corrupt governments in modern history. BMW came to be linked to this corruption and the governing party, the PRD, and suddenly became a very unpopular car. You would not like to be seen driving around in such a car in the years after Jorge Blanco left the presidency in 1986 since everyone would assume you got the car for free (or free of any taxes) from the government, and that you were corrupt. BMWs therefore became unpopular and were a rare sight for many years. Walking around Santo Domingo today, however, I see that the newly rich lack knowledge of history or just plainly don't mind, and drive around in the newest, biggest and fastest BMWs you can get your hands on.
Today another brand is tarnished by connections to the government, but today the contrast between the cars the middle and upper middle classes drive and the government-friendly groups drive, is diminished. As mentioned above, the DR has the highest proportion of SUVs compared to other cars in the world. Therefore it is only natural that the government has advanced from a BMW to a Yipeta as they say over here. For a long time it was the Mitsubishi Montero (or Pajero in most other non-Spanish speaking countries) that was popular in government circles, but the recent Leonel governments has taken it up a notch. Now it is the Toyota Land Cruiser Prado, commonly known as the Prado, which is the government Yipeta. You will see them with official licence plates (OC) driving around Santo Domingo in the weeks, and all over the country in the weekends when government employees travel back home or on weekend trips. People are annoyed by the Prado for several reasons. There are many of them and it is a luxury car. In fact, I think, including all brands, that there are more official cars (license plate OC) in Santo Domingo than there are diplomatic cars (License plate CD) in Brussels which is home to EU, NATO, a load of embassies, etc. Many also seem to be annoyed with the fact that people driving these cars today were in no position to drive such cars before entering government. In other words they have become richer than what their social status before Leonel allowed for (i.e. undeserving rich). Today, however, many people drive around in luxury cars in the capital. Walking around certain areas in Santo Domingo seems like walking around in Hollywood (although I have never been there) considering the cars people drive. Therefore the stigma of the Prado is much weaker than what is was for the BMW 25 years ago, but it is strong enough that I think that if Mejía of the PRD wins the election, the Prado will be out and new Yipetas will come in (my bet is on big Ford models, actually).
There are clearly other stigmatised political cars in the DR as well, Hyundai models from the 2002 Pan-American games is one example, the buses under the first Leonel government is another, the three above, however, are the most notorious. If any reader should know of more car-stories like this in the DR or other places, please comment.
Cars are important in this country, both in the cities because they are now built as US cities in which cars are a must (but also due to the heat which makes walking uncomfortable, lack of effective public transportation in the cities, despite the new Metro, and the lack of sidewalks), but also in the rural areas due to distances and other factors. Not only are cars important, but due to the low quality of the roads and a host of other reasons (such as the importance of looking good in your car, social status, road security, and just be bigger than the others), the DR is the country (or at least last time I checked 3 years back) with the highest proportion of SUVs compared to other cars in the world. That is quite impressive for a country that is not among the richest Latin American nations.
This blog posting, however is about political cars, and I will mention three models: The old WV Beetle (Cepillo), BMW (of the early 1980s) and the Toyota Land Rover Prado. All of these cars have gained a bad reputation among the Dominican people.
A curious fact about the DR since the 1960s it has been almost impossible to see the VW Beetle in the streets of the country. This is a surprise for several reasons. First of all the Beetle has been one of the most sold cars worldwide. And another reason is that it has been popular in Latin America since it was rather economical, but also produced in Mexico and Brazil. The reason for the lack of Beetles, or Cepillos, in the DR is that they were used by the notorious secret police SIM (Servicio de Intelegencia Militar) led by the hated and deceiptful Johnny Abbes under the Trujillo regime. The black Beetles would be driven around the cities and towns to spread fear and keep people under tight control by the regime. As in most authoritarian regime, the secret police would find a way to oversee any activity, suspicious or not, and know as many details as possible about as many as possible. After Trujillo was assassined on May 30 1961, his regime and SIM soon fell apart. Since the Beetle was identified and linked to violence, disappearances, and other atrocities, nobody wanted to buy it after Trujillo fell. Therefore, you can only today, as well as earlier, only find a handful of these cars across the country.
BMW is another german brand that is very popular worldwide, although somewhat more luxurious and expensive than the Beetle. And it is due to the price and luxuriousness of this car that it has a special political history in the DR. After 12 years of conservative rule by Joaquín Balaguer, who served as president under the Trujillo regime, the social-democratic opposition party, PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano) won the presidency in 1978 and again in 1982. In 1978 it was Antonio Guzmán who served as president, a man who today is respected for guiding the country through the transition to democracy and for being honest and not corrupt. Other parts of his government, including President Guzmán's daughter, however, were accused of corruption. In 1982 Salvador Jorge Blanco won the presidency for the PRD promising democracy with social justice, and focusing on social redistribution a factor he felt had been neglected under the Guzmán presidency. 1982 (and the 1980s in general), however, was not a good year for Latin America, and the DR soon were facing tough economic battles, which led to several rounds of inflation and devaluation of the Dominican Peso (which some years back had been pegged to the US dollar at 1:1). In midst of an economic crisis (which the government managed quite well, actually), however, many people linked to the government started driving around in fancy new BMWs, and showing off money which the newly rich like to do. The contrast between the economic troubles and the apparent corruption was stark, and the Jorge Blanco government therefore (maybe undeserved) has been remembered as one of the more corrupt governments in modern history. BMW came to be linked to this corruption and the governing party, the PRD, and suddenly became a very unpopular car. You would not like to be seen driving around in such a car in the years after Jorge Blanco left the presidency in 1986 since everyone would assume you got the car for free (or free of any taxes) from the government, and that you were corrupt. BMWs therefore became unpopular and were a rare sight for many years. Walking around Santo Domingo today, however, I see that the newly rich lack knowledge of history or just plainly don't mind, and drive around in the newest, biggest and fastest BMWs you can get your hands on.
Today another brand is tarnished by connections to the government, but today the contrast between the cars the middle and upper middle classes drive and the government-friendly groups drive, is diminished. As mentioned above, the DR has the highest proportion of SUVs compared to other cars in the world. Therefore it is only natural that the government has advanced from a BMW to a Yipeta as they say over here. For a long time it was the Mitsubishi Montero (or Pajero in most other non-Spanish speaking countries) that was popular in government circles, but the recent Leonel governments has taken it up a notch. Now it is the Toyota Land Cruiser Prado, commonly known as the Prado, which is the government Yipeta. You will see them with official licence plates (OC) driving around Santo Domingo in the weeks, and all over the country in the weekends when government employees travel back home or on weekend trips. People are annoyed by the Prado for several reasons. There are many of them and it is a luxury car. In fact, I think, including all brands, that there are more official cars (license plate OC) in Santo Domingo than there are diplomatic cars (License plate CD) in Brussels which is home to EU, NATO, a load of embassies, etc. Many also seem to be annoyed with the fact that people driving these cars today were in no position to drive such cars before entering government. In other words they have become richer than what their social status before Leonel allowed for (i.e. undeserving rich). Today, however, many people drive around in luxury cars in the capital. Walking around certain areas in Santo Domingo seems like walking around in Hollywood (although I have never been there) considering the cars people drive. Therefore the stigma of the Prado is much weaker than what is was for the BMW 25 years ago, but it is strong enough that I think that if Mejía of the PRD wins the election, the Prado will be out and new Yipetas will come in (my bet is on big Ford models, actually).
There are clearly other stigmatised political cars in the DR as well, Hyundai models from the 2002 Pan-American games is one example, the buses under the first Leonel government is another, the three above, however, are the most notorious. If any reader should know of more car-stories like this in the DR or other places, please comment.
Monday, 26 March 2012
Monday March 26...in Santo Domingo
Some of the posts I put out will be more of a diary type and shortly summarise some of the last events of the elections and politics more in general. This is one of these posts.
Yesterday was an important date for the elections since the Junta Central Electoral (www.jce.do) officially accepted the candidacies for president and vice president, and started verifying the electoral roll (census of registered voters). PLD runs with Danilo Medina and Margarita Cedeño, PRD with Hipólito Mejía and Luis Abinader, and PRSC will not have a proper candidate but supports officially Danilo Medina (you can actually vote for Medina on a PRSC ticket on May 20). There are four more groups of candidates from minor parties (if parties is the proper name for any of the political parties in the country right now): Eduardo Estrella for DxC (Dominicanos por el Cambio), Estrella from Cibao was presidential candidate for the PRSC in 2004, in 2008 he ran as presidential candidate for PRSD (Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata, Hatuey DeCamps splinter party from the PRD...interestingly after a deal PRSD will this year support Mejía and the PRD and DeCamps has become one of Mejía's campaign managers...evil tongues have it that DeCamps does this only to bury Mejía as a revenge against Mejía running for re-election in 2004). This is therefore Estrella's third bid for the presidency, for his third party, in eight years. Max Puig is the presidential candidate for Alianza por la democracia, APD, a party he founded when he officially left the PLD. Puig was as recently as 2004 named environmental minister by Fernández, and until recently his party has supported and allied with the PLD. The real "independent candidate" this year, and one who might be popular with the middle classes who are tired of the same old from the established parties, is Guillermo Moreno for the party Alianza País. Moreno is a lawyer, a popular education among Dominican politicians and he has earlier worked as an academic, lawyer and as prosecutor general in Santo Domingo. Earlier he has represented MIUCA (Movimiento Independencia Unidad y Cambio), which used to play the role as the intelectual alternative to the major parties but this year supports Julian Serrulle (see below). If Moreno can capture enough votes of the people who are "jarto", then there might be a second round in the presidential elections. The last candidate is Julian Serrulle for the Frente Amplio party. Serrulle comes from a well-known political family as well and just as Max Puig he considered himself close to Juan Bosch, and the PLD. In sum we have the two main candidates, two independent candidates that come out of the PLD, one from the PRSC and one which has very little history with the main parties.
JCE also started revising the electoral roll, which means checking that all with a right to vote is registered as a voter and registered at a polling station that enables voting. Historically, the electoral roll (padrón electoral) has been the source of electoral fraud in the country, most famously in 1994 with the displacement of up to 300.000 voters, but this year I do not think one should expect any greater problems. The OAS has been present to oversee the revision, but the PRD (just to be sure) is on top of the process and is complaining that their voters (in particular) may be displaced. There has been a few reasons for concern regarding the Center for computing in the JCE, partly because both in the Center and the JCE key members are considered to be too closely associated with the PLD. Since this promises to be a close election, such concerns should be taken seriously.
On another note, today Diario Libre ran a story that nicely demonstrates the workings of a clientelistic state. The DR political culture and regime must be caracterised as clientelistic, and Hartlyn in his 1998 book called the regime neopatrimonial. This is a description that still fits today. Diario Libre could report that 80% of the vice-ministers (sub-secretary of state) are inorganic, which means that they are not nominated by law. It also means that these do not do any work for the state, they only receive a salary. Most of these do not even have an office. In total Diario Libre found that only 36 vice-ministers are nominated according to the law and potentially do any real work for the government. 154 vice-ministers are not nominated according to the law and probably do not do anything for the government, except receive a salary, potentially a car and maybe some funds for private security, etc. There are 20 ministries in the country, so the total sum of 190 vice-ministers is quite high. The PRD economist, or economist with a known affiliation with the PRD, Andrés Dauhajre Jr. came to an even higher figure last year. He argues that there are 334 vice-ministers in the country. The actual minister of Public Administration, Ramón Ventura, reports that his ministry has produced regulations of the nomination of vice-ministers, and he has given his colleagues until June to remove any superfluous vice-ministers. My guess is that this regulation will not be respected and that things will continue like they are even after the elections. The reason is that vice-ministries are currency for alliances (together with among other things the presidency of the Liga Municipal Dominicana), and these are as important as ever given that ideological differences are almost non-existent between the main parties (this is confirmed by the Elite surveys done by the Universidad de Salamanca). Supporting the two top candidates are for the PLD: PRSC, BIS (former Peña Gómez, PRD, faction), UDC (Unión Demócrata Cristiana), Partido Quiqueyano Demócrata Cristiano, FNP (Fuerza Nacional Progresista), Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos (PTD), Partido Popular Cristiano, Partido Demócrata Popular, Partido Cívico Renovador, Partido Liberal de la República Dominicana, Partido de Acción Liberal (PAL), Partido Socialista Verde and Partido de la Unidad Nacional. Supporting the PRD we find the former splinter party PRSD, Partido Demócrata Institucional, Partido Movimiento Democrático Alternativo, Partido Humanista Dominicano and Partio Alianza Social Dominicana. All in all 18 parties, which are not really parties, but entities of electoral accountability that helps the main party keep scores of how many votes the minor parties contributed with in their victory. From that score, once in government, a president may start paying out. And, they pay out with vice-ministries.
A last funny note was a letter of opinion written in Hoy on March 23 by Ramón Arturo Guerrero, which compared Leonel Fernández with President-elect Putin of Russia. I expected a nice story about how Medina would be for Leonel what Medvedev was to Putin, but no. It was a piece comparing their backgrounds growing up in authoritarian systems, education, etc. and which compared their popularity. Both leaders, Guerrero argued, implemented democracy in their respective countries and ruled with high quality. Guerrero concludes that Fernández as Putin, could come back in 2016 (and for some reason be re-elected in 2020, apparently Guerrero assumes that someone will reform the constitution again and open for immediate presidential re-election, again). Although I am critical to President Fernández's work as president, I must say that he strikes as somewhat more democratic than Putin. Guerrero, who obviously is a Fernández supporter, did not make a very flattering comparison for his president.
Yesterday was an important date for the elections since the Junta Central Electoral (www.jce.do) officially accepted the candidacies for president and vice president, and started verifying the electoral roll (census of registered voters). PLD runs with Danilo Medina and Margarita Cedeño, PRD with Hipólito Mejía and Luis Abinader, and PRSC will not have a proper candidate but supports officially Danilo Medina (you can actually vote for Medina on a PRSC ticket on May 20). There are four more groups of candidates from minor parties (if parties is the proper name for any of the political parties in the country right now): Eduardo Estrella for DxC (Dominicanos por el Cambio), Estrella from Cibao was presidential candidate for the PRSC in 2004, in 2008 he ran as presidential candidate for PRSD (Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata, Hatuey DeCamps splinter party from the PRD...interestingly after a deal PRSD will this year support Mejía and the PRD and DeCamps has become one of Mejía's campaign managers...evil tongues have it that DeCamps does this only to bury Mejía as a revenge against Mejía running for re-election in 2004). This is therefore Estrella's third bid for the presidency, for his third party, in eight years. Max Puig is the presidential candidate for Alianza por la democracia, APD, a party he founded when he officially left the PLD. Puig was as recently as 2004 named environmental minister by Fernández, and until recently his party has supported and allied with the PLD. The real "independent candidate" this year, and one who might be popular with the middle classes who are tired of the same old from the established parties, is Guillermo Moreno for the party Alianza País. Moreno is a lawyer, a popular education among Dominican politicians and he has earlier worked as an academic, lawyer and as prosecutor general in Santo Domingo. Earlier he has represented MIUCA (Movimiento Independencia Unidad y Cambio), which used to play the role as the intelectual alternative to the major parties but this year supports Julian Serrulle (see below). If Moreno can capture enough votes of the people who are "jarto", then there might be a second round in the presidential elections. The last candidate is Julian Serrulle for the Frente Amplio party. Serrulle comes from a well-known political family as well and just as Max Puig he considered himself close to Juan Bosch, and the PLD. In sum we have the two main candidates, two independent candidates that come out of the PLD, one from the PRSC and one which has very little history with the main parties.
JCE also started revising the electoral roll, which means checking that all with a right to vote is registered as a voter and registered at a polling station that enables voting. Historically, the electoral roll (padrón electoral) has been the source of electoral fraud in the country, most famously in 1994 with the displacement of up to 300.000 voters, but this year I do not think one should expect any greater problems. The OAS has been present to oversee the revision, but the PRD (just to be sure) is on top of the process and is complaining that their voters (in particular) may be displaced. There has been a few reasons for concern regarding the Center for computing in the JCE, partly because both in the Center and the JCE key members are considered to be too closely associated with the PLD. Since this promises to be a close election, such concerns should be taken seriously.
On another note, today Diario Libre ran a story that nicely demonstrates the workings of a clientelistic state. The DR political culture and regime must be caracterised as clientelistic, and Hartlyn in his 1998 book called the regime neopatrimonial. This is a description that still fits today. Diario Libre could report that 80% of the vice-ministers (sub-secretary of state) are inorganic, which means that they are not nominated by law. It also means that these do not do any work for the state, they only receive a salary. Most of these do not even have an office. In total Diario Libre found that only 36 vice-ministers are nominated according to the law and potentially do any real work for the government. 154 vice-ministers are not nominated according to the law and probably do not do anything for the government, except receive a salary, potentially a car and maybe some funds for private security, etc. There are 20 ministries in the country, so the total sum of 190 vice-ministers is quite high. The PRD economist, or economist with a known affiliation with the PRD, Andrés Dauhajre Jr. came to an even higher figure last year. He argues that there are 334 vice-ministers in the country. The actual minister of Public Administration, Ramón Ventura, reports that his ministry has produced regulations of the nomination of vice-ministers, and he has given his colleagues until June to remove any superfluous vice-ministers. My guess is that this regulation will not be respected and that things will continue like they are even after the elections. The reason is that vice-ministries are currency for alliances (together with among other things the presidency of the Liga Municipal Dominicana), and these are as important as ever given that ideological differences are almost non-existent between the main parties (this is confirmed by the Elite surveys done by the Universidad de Salamanca). Supporting the two top candidates are for the PLD: PRSC, BIS (former Peña Gómez, PRD, faction), UDC (Unión Demócrata Cristiana), Partido Quiqueyano Demócrata Cristiano, FNP (Fuerza Nacional Progresista), Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos (PTD), Partido Popular Cristiano, Partido Demócrata Popular, Partido Cívico Renovador, Partido Liberal de la República Dominicana, Partido de Acción Liberal (PAL), Partido Socialista Verde and Partido de la Unidad Nacional. Supporting the PRD we find the former splinter party PRSD, Partido Demócrata Institucional, Partido Movimiento Democrático Alternativo, Partido Humanista Dominicano and Partio Alianza Social Dominicana. All in all 18 parties, which are not really parties, but entities of electoral accountability that helps the main party keep scores of how many votes the minor parties contributed with in their victory. From that score, once in government, a president may start paying out. And, they pay out with vice-ministries.
A last funny note was a letter of opinion written in Hoy on March 23 by Ramón Arturo Guerrero, which compared Leonel Fernández with President-elect Putin of Russia. I expected a nice story about how Medina would be for Leonel what Medvedev was to Putin, but no. It was a piece comparing their backgrounds growing up in authoritarian systems, education, etc. and which compared their popularity. Both leaders, Guerrero argued, implemented democracy in their respective countries and ruled with high quality. Guerrero concludes that Fernández as Putin, could come back in 2016 (and for some reason be re-elected in 2020, apparently Guerrero assumes that someone will reform the constitution again and open for immediate presidential re-election, again). Although I am critical to President Fernández's work as president, I must say that he strikes as somewhat more democratic than Putin. Guerrero, who obviously is a Fernández supporter, did not make a very flattering comparison for his president.
Sunday, 25 March 2012
The battle over education in the DR
(One has to be careful when using blogger on Iphone...I accidentally deleted this blog from March 25, and repost it now)
A bit more than a year ago, the DR suddenlyexperienced one of its first modern collective, civil-society mobilisations,and it articulated demands for better quality in the education system in thecountry. The protests hit President Leonel Fernández quite hard and the size,level of uproar and level of mobilisation was a surprise, I think, both to thegovernment and everyone else.
To almost everyone's disappointment, Leonel presented a budget for 2011 (andlater for 2012) that did not increase the funds for education, and Congress passed a law that basically gave President Fernández the right to violate the 66/97 education law and spend less than that law stipulated on education. Leonel thus presenteda budget that maintained funding for education stable at about 1.8% of GDP. Theprotests, however, together with an internal dissent in the PLD led Congress toincrease funds for education about 4,000 million DOP, which could beinterpreted as a victory (albeit a small one) for the opposition and the 4%group. This of course was old news until FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales) and others decided to follow up the government's effort ineducation. A recent report by FLACSO picked up by Diario Libre, Hoy and othernews media, demonstrated that the ministry of education spent 6,788 million DOPless than budgeted by congress. The ministry thus spent less than theadministration had originally proposed in the budget. In fact the ministryspent only about 85% of what was budgeted after Congress's increase of about4,000 million DOP. The renowned journalist Juan Bolívar Díaz called it "Otra burla a la voluntad popular" in the newspaper Hoy on Sunday, March 25.
A bit more than a year ago, the DR suddenlyexperienced one of its first modern collective, civil-society mobilisations,and it articulated demands for better quality in the education system in thecountry. The protests hit President Leonel Fernández quite hard and the size,level of uproar and level of mobilisation was a surprise, I think, both to thegovernment and everyone else.
The demands were for the government to comply with law 66/97 that stipulates that the education ministry shouldreceive funds equivalent to 4% of the country's GDP. The law was passed duringLeonel's first government, but with the votes also from the opposition (PRD).Anyway, since 1997 the governments have never met this target, and the fundsgiven to education has lingered between 1.5-1.8% of GDP since 1998. Obviously,all three Fernández administrations and the Mejía administration violated theeducation law.
Last year groups mainly from the middleclass organised rather spontaneously and using new social networks to demandthat the government comply with the law of education and spend 4% of GDP oneducation. The group used yellow as its colour and the message was simple (as it was unrealistic): Idemand 4%. Leonel's nice rhetoric finally met with the hard realities and thetwo did not match up. The organisers of the 4% actions were so succesful thatthe government became rather desperate. Suddenly people wearing yellow t-shirts were denied access to the cathedral, national monuments and other publicplaces. (the serious) Parts of Leonel's own party started demanding that forthe 2011 budget the President should correct former wrongs and add more fundsto education. The opposition of course was also demanding (suddenly) more fundsfor education, even though in all previous years the PRD and PRSC had remainedrelatively silent on the subject. The whole debacle was an interestingdemonstration of civil society mobilisation moving setting the agenda andcreating sufficient momentum to actually achieve positive results. I wasactually quite impressed since this does not occur frequently in the DR (exceptfor taxi drivers and transporters' strikes which generally achieve their goals).
To almost everyone's disappointment, Leonel presented a budget for 2011 (andlater for 2012) that did not increase the funds for education, and Congress passed a law that basically gave President Fernández the right to violate the 66/97 education law and spend less than that law stipulated on education. Leonel thus presenteda budget that maintained funding for education stable at about 1.8% of GDP. Theprotests, however, together with an internal dissent in the PLD led Congress toincrease funds for education about 4,000 million DOP, which could beinterpreted as a victory (albeit a small one) for the opposition and the 4%group. This of course was old news until FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales) and others decided to follow up the government's effort ineducation. A recent report by FLACSO picked up by Diario Libre, Hoy and othernews media, demonstrated that the ministry of education spent 6,788 million DOPless than budgeted by congress. The ministry thus spent less than theadministration had originally proposed in the budget. In fact the ministryspent only about 85% of what was budgeted after Congress's increase of about4,000 million DOP. The renowned journalist Juan Bolívar Díaz called it "Otra burla a la voluntad popular" in the newspaper Hoy on Sunday, March 25.
This news has come back to haunt the PLDgovernment led by Leonel Fernández, himself an educated, and intellectual,president, who one would think, believing in his speeches, would supporteducation. The story became big news both in Diario Libre, Acento and Hoy. My research, however, demonstrates that the recent negligence ineducation, and the recent under-spending, is not new, but rather follows up along-held legacy since Balaguer's 12 años (1966-1978) (for more, see for instance my Master's thesis and my article in ALH.
The graph above shows spending compared to passed budget in the ministry of education from 1966-2009 (data based on official proposed budget and executed budget). Basically the graph demonstrates that it is quite normal that DR administrations spend less money on education than what is originally budgeted. In fact from 1966-2009, on average only 87% of the budget was spent by the ministry of education. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the ministry of education only managed to spend 85% of its budgeted funds in 2011. The graph, however, also demonstrates that the trend is that governments in the DR are improving. Starting out at about 80% of spent allocations, the ministry of education today is spending on average more than 90% of its funds. This indeed, is a positive development, even though it has taken more than forty years...
But, how much do Dominican governments spend on education? Generally the country score extremely low in Latin American comparisons. The following graph tracks the percentage of all budget expenses that goes to education in the same 1966-2009 period.
Now, beware that this is percentage of all budget expenses, not percentage of GDP which the big 4% debate is about. The graph demonstrates first that as share of all budget expenses became less important as the Balaguer administrations (1966-1978, 1986-1990) progressed, and that education received its lowest share of the budget during the Balaguer regimes. Furthermore, the administrations that took over after Balaguer (PRD 1978, PLD in 1996) increased drastically education's share of total budget expenses. However, under both PRD's first and second stint in power (1992-86, 2000-04), education lost importance with time, in both periods maybe due to the on-going economic hardship that hit the PRD administrations. After Mejía left power in 2004, Fernández's administrations did not increase spending to education, and the budgets have stabilised about 8-10% of all budget expenses. But, how much do Dominican governments spend on education? Generally the country score extremely low in Latin American comparisons. The following graph tracks the percentage of all budget expenses that goes to education in the same 1966-2009 period.
What can we conclude: All administrations do not pay sufficient attention to education in the DR, all administration tend to give less money than budgeted to education, a fact that makes matters worse, and all administrations since 1997 have broken the law (and some might say the constitution). There is therefore good reasons to be sceptical towards the candidates' promises of 4% to education. Regardless of this it is also important that the well-intentioned groups fighting for the 4% target accept compromises along the road since doubling the education ministry's budget would not bevery fruitful. The education ministry would probably not know how to tackle so much funds and it would only open up for more corruption. What one could hope for is stable increases in the budget share for education so that in maybe 10 years the country might reach the target established by law. The great disappointment for the Dominicans should be that this development never started in 1998.
Thursday, 22 March 2012
Welcome to my blog
This is the first, short post in my newly created blog on Dominican politics, and in particular the Dominican 2012 presidential elections, which I will be following "on site" in Santo Domingo from now and until May 20.
I will try to sum up and analyse important events during the campaign and maybe also draw some lines between the current campaign and recent political history in the country.
Currently the election campaign is heating up and there are basically too many things going on for me to capture every detail. Some of the issues I do want to focus on in the days and weeks to come, however, are the candidates: Danilo Medina and Hipólito Mejía for the PLD (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana) and PRD (Partido de la Revolución Dominicana), respectively, who both ran as presidential candidates in 2000 when Mejía ; the party system and main political parties (PLD, PRD and the rests of the split PRSC); the scandals and more than anything else the corruption allegations; connected to this I hope to get time to write on the so-called Margaritagate which included allegations that the current First Lady and candidate for the Vice-Presidency for PLD, Margarita Cedeño, had a bank-account in Denmark with 43 million €; Felix Bautista, the strong-man, Leonel's protegé and friend, and PLD-senator who has been involved in corruption schemes earlier and now may be one of the reasons for the recent change of Prime Minister in Haiti; current President Leonel Fernández merits some words, already president for twelve years and younger than Balaguer was before he started his "doce años" in 1966; another very interesting topic is the war of the surveys in the campaign and how these are used by the candidates; the political party alliances and the minor parties; the father and son party FNP (Fuerza Nacional Progresista) that has supported the PLD since 1996 in a xenophobic alliance; and the message (or lack thereof) of the candidates in this campaign.
These are only some topics that I hope to start blogging about already tomorrow.
As a short intro I can say that the presidential elections for 2012 will be a battle between two candidates, PLD's Danilo Medina who picked the first lady Margarita Cedeño as his vice-presidential candidate, and PRD's Hipólito Mejía who picked Luis Abinader from a traditional PRD family as his vice-presidential candidate. It will be a very tight race and there are two uncertainties going on at the moment: Who will win? And, will there be a need for a second electoral round? In the DR there is a ballotage if the leading candidate does not obtain at least 50% of the votes in the first round. This rule was implemented for the 1996 presidential election, and this year was the only year that a second round was needed (Leonel Fernández beat José Francisco Peña Gómez, PRD, in the second round). In 2000 Hipólito Mejía was very close to reaching 50% of the votes in the first round, and after presidential candidate Balaguer, PRSC, had said there wouldn't be any need for a second round, Mejía was declared the winner. In the 2004 and 2008 Fernández obtained more than 50% of the votes in the first round in two-horse races against Hipólito Mejía and Miguel Vargas (PRD). Whether there will be a second round or not this time, depends on how many votes the minor parties can catch and the closeness of the race among the two main contenders. The PRSC this year has basically decided to retire its own party, now controlled by Foreign Minister Carlos Morales Troncoso, and supports Medina in this race.
Up until recently my money would have been on Hipólito Mejía and the PRD. First because I think many are tired of the PLD rule and the great difference between Leonel's rhetoric and socio-economic realities. Second, sufficent new voters have been enrolled and sufficient older voters have forgotten that between 2000-2004 Hipólito Mejía most likely was the worst president (at least in economic terms) since the start of democracy in 1978. Three, Medina is not a very popular candidate outside the PLD-organisation. The last couple of months I have started slowly to change my mind since Margarita gives Medina access to state resources during the campaign, and she lets him get a hold on Leonel followers. This might be enough to get him elected. I think a Medina victory might be good for democracy in the country because it would weaken somewhat Leonel's hold on the PLD and open that party up, and the PRD might have to get some new and younger blood into the leadership of the party. A Mejía victory might be bad for the country if he rules like he did last time, and it would strengthen both Leonel and Mejía's position in their respective parties. On the other hand, a change in government after 8 years of PLD might be even more important for the country's democracy, but if this happens it is a bit sad that presidency will be handed over to a "devil we know" (to cite political scientist Javier Corrales).
Hopefully we will know on May 20 who wins, and then we will know if Hartlyn's hypothesis from his 1998 book that the tighter the election the higher risk for an electoral crisis, is correct. Although I hope that an electoral crisis will be avoided in this presumably tight election, I do think that the tighter the election result the more advantegous for the incumbent party. Luckily the Junta Central Electoral is a much more professional electoral organiser now than in 1994, although it seems somewhat more politicised (and PLD) dominated than before.
I will try to sum up and analyse important events during the campaign and maybe also draw some lines between the current campaign and recent political history in the country.
Currently the election campaign is heating up and there are basically too many things going on for me to capture every detail. Some of the issues I do want to focus on in the days and weeks to come, however, are the candidates: Danilo Medina and Hipólito Mejía for the PLD (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana) and PRD (Partido de la Revolución Dominicana), respectively, who both ran as presidential candidates in 2000 when Mejía ; the party system and main political parties (PLD, PRD and the rests of the split PRSC); the scandals and more than anything else the corruption allegations; connected to this I hope to get time to write on the so-called Margaritagate which included allegations that the current First Lady and candidate for the Vice-Presidency for PLD, Margarita Cedeño, had a bank-account in Denmark with 43 million €; Felix Bautista, the strong-man, Leonel's protegé and friend, and PLD-senator who has been involved in corruption schemes earlier and now may be one of the reasons for the recent change of Prime Minister in Haiti; current President Leonel Fernández merits some words, already president for twelve years and younger than Balaguer was before he started his "doce años" in 1966; another very interesting topic is the war of the surveys in the campaign and how these are used by the candidates; the political party alliances and the minor parties; the father and son party FNP (Fuerza Nacional Progresista) that has supported the PLD since 1996 in a xenophobic alliance; and the message (or lack thereof) of the candidates in this campaign.
These are only some topics that I hope to start blogging about already tomorrow.
As a short intro I can say that the presidential elections for 2012 will be a battle between two candidates, PLD's Danilo Medina who picked the first lady Margarita Cedeño as his vice-presidential candidate, and PRD's Hipólito Mejía who picked Luis Abinader from a traditional PRD family as his vice-presidential candidate. It will be a very tight race and there are two uncertainties going on at the moment: Who will win? And, will there be a need for a second electoral round? In the DR there is a ballotage if the leading candidate does not obtain at least 50% of the votes in the first round. This rule was implemented for the 1996 presidential election, and this year was the only year that a second round was needed (Leonel Fernández beat José Francisco Peña Gómez, PRD, in the second round). In 2000 Hipólito Mejía was very close to reaching 50% of the votes in the first round, and after presidential candidate Balaguer, PRSC, had said there wouldn't be any need for a second round, Mejía was declared the winner. In the 2004 and 2008 Fernández obtained more than 50% of the votes in the first round in two-horse races against Hipólito Mejía and Miguel Vargas (PRD). Whether there will be a second round or not this time, depends on how many votes the minor parties can catch and the closeness of the race among the two main contenders. The PRSC this year has basically decided to retire its own party, now controlled by Foreign Minister Carlos Morales Troncoso, and supports Medina in this race.
Up until recently my money would have been on Hipólito Mejía and the PRD. First because I think many are tired of the PLD rule and the great difference between Leonel's rhetoric and socio-economic realities. Second, sufficent new voters have been enrolled and sufficient older voters have forgotten that between 2000-2004 Hipólito Mejía most likely was the worst president (at least in economic terms) since the start of democracy in 1978. Three, Medina is not a very popular candidate outside the PLD-organisation. The last couple of months I have started slowly to change my mind since Margarita gives Medina access to state resources during the campaign, and she lets him get a hold on Leonel followers. This might be enough to get him elected. I think a Medina victory might be good for democracy in the country because it would weaken somewhat Leonel's hold on the PLD and open that party up, and the PRD might have to get some new and younger blood into the leadership of the party. A Mejía victory might be bad for the country if he rules like he did last time, and it would strengthen both Leonel and Mejía's position in their respective parties. On the other hand, a change in government after 8 years of PLD might be even more important for the country's democracy, but if this happens it is a bit sad that presidency will be handed over to a "devil we know" (to cite political scientist Javier Corrales).
Hopefully we will know on May 20 who wins, and then we will know if Hartlyn's hypothesis from his 1998 book that the tighter the election the higher risk for an electoral crisis, is correct. Although I hope that an electoral crisis will be avoided in this presumably tight election, I do think that the tighter the election result the more advantegous for the incumbent party. Luckily the Junta Central Electoral is a much more professional electoral organiser now than in 1994, although it seems somewhat more politicised (and PLD) dominated than before.
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