Even though the Félix Bautista case still looms over this election campaign, it is time to sum up what this Bautista-corruption case tells us about the Dominican political system.
First however, a very brief update since last. Nuria and other media (in particular acento.com.do and Hoy...finally) have dug further into the case and revealed how Félix Bautista ruled the OISOE and helped his friends (and himself) get rich by doling out state construction contracts that were illegal and valued too highly. Second, the smoke-screen tactic of the government has partly worked, Pepe Goico had to appear in front of a local prosecutor for questioning yesterday, while Félix Bautista of course, runs free. Third, and this is ugly, a PLD senator (Wilton Guerrero) said he had from a good source that drug traffickers close to Mejía's campaign were out to kill Nuria Piera. Piera, naturally, is now worried for her and her family's life. Today, the senator admitted he had no evidence whatsoever for what he was saying. But he (and the PLD) did manage to scare Nuria Piera. Quite a paradox that President Leonel Fernández not long ago put out a book discussing press freedom and the free word...while his government is probably doing more harm to freedom of the press in this country since the Balaguer governments (1986-1996). Fernández, as always, is silent on this matter, as he always is when it comes to corruption.
Anyway, back to the lessons about the Dominican Political system. Given all the evidence against Bautista, any regular democracy would have started an investigation against him. It is a minimal test the regime must pass should anything it says on anti-corruption be taken seriously. If nothing is done, however, in such a case of rampant and proven corruption, it demonstrates clearly that the regime does not take the issue of corruption seriously (which should come as no surprise for any close observer of the Dominican political system, but may surprise people, investigators, politicians, who only know the country from the outside). The way the Bautista case has been handled by the government and the government party, the PLD, has turned out to be just as big a scandal as the corruption case itself (for details, read two of my earlier blogs on the matter).
The lessons are:
1) There is no judicial independence in the DR. The lack of investigation into a case that is presented almost as fully investigated by Nuria Piear with damaging evidence, shows that the Ministry of Justice (Ministerio Público) and its Prosecutor General has no independence or autonomy to act on charges of corruption. This becomes even clearer when we know that the person that should have been investigated is the President's best friend (and who according to rumours is the guy behind Bautista reaping the benefits of Bautista's corruption schemes). If the prosecutor had been a professional and independent of the president, investigations would have commenced.
2) The Ministry of Justice is subordinate to other ministries and interests, and is being commanded by other people than its boss, the prosecutor general. Why? This is one reasonable explanation for why the prosecutor general decides to use state resources to investigate cases that are presented with such bad evidence that anyone can see the charges don't hold up. Why investigate supposed coup-plans against Haiti, when it is obvious from the evidence presented that this is not the plan? Why prioritise cases that don't stick over cases that clearly holds water? The only explanation is that the Ministry is used for the government's political purpose (win the election) and also to aid a neighbouring government (Haiti) from corruption charges.
3) The case demonstrates that the Dominican Senators couldn't recognise a crook even if they were held on gunpoint and were releaved of their yipetas (jeeps), much less recognise corruption. I have long argued for the closure of the Senate in the DR, a small country with few regional differences and no federalism. There is simply no need for this useless institution (ask anyone having anything to do with the Senate, they will agree). Going out in defence of Félix Bautista when it is demonstrated that he is corrupt, is just bad. The Senate and the PLD thus look more like a sect than a political party. Had the Senate had any decency they would have stated that the institution was ready to lift Bautista's immunity if the prosecutor general asked for this. The Senators represent their voters and taxpayers: is it in the taxpayers' best interest that their representatives defend a guy who steals from them?
4) There is press freedom in the DR, although some say under pressure. The greatest problem, however, is that the journalists themselves prefer to take payments from the government rather than to do their work properly. Press freedom is demonstrated by Nuria, acento.com.do, etc. The rest, such as Diario Libre, Hoy, El Caribe, Listín Diario, demonstrate too much respect for the government, fear of the government, or that they receive payment to silence critical news (to cite the tweet of journalist Marino Zapete, @mzapete: "Con excepción a la compra de periodistas y el chantaje, el gobierno no tiene ninguna política en materia de comunicación"). It is an embarrasment that respected newspapers such as Hoy and Listín Diario decide to use more space on false rumours and accusations than on the real deal. Any newspaper with any self-respect would be all over a story that the president's closest ally, and senator for the governing party, is taken with his pants down enriching himself and buying favours in Haiti, Peru and Panamá. The press in the DR should be ashamed, very ashamed for their priorities during this case.
5) The case also demonstrates that even though democracy has taken a hold in the country, the regime, state and government do not hold a democratic mind. The government together with Haiti's government have done what it can to make the playing field unlevel and difficult for the opposition. It is behind false accusations and lies that involve a coup-complot in Haiti, the killing of the PRD president, the murder of Nuria Piera, and several more embarrassing attempts at getting off the hook of the ugly corruption charges against it. The government has demonstrated that it uses illegal recordings of phone conversation to attack the opposition. The international scandal (in addition to Félix Bautista bribing Haiti's president Martelly) is that the governments of Haiti and Dominican Republic blatantly lie about coup plans against the Haitian government. If the accusations were true (and they should be given the fact that they were presented by the Dominican Minister of State, Prosecutor General and ambassador to Haiti, in addition to the Haitian Minister of Justice, and ambassador to the DR) should this not be a case to bring forth at the OAS. This could clearly be cause to invoke article 1080? I would have loved to see the two governments' attempt to convoke an extraordinary meeting in the OAS on these grounds. The governments have made a mockery out of serious institutions such as the national elections, the OAS articles regarding the defence of democracy, and they have made a mockery out of themselves in order to avoid any serious investigation into the deeply rooted corruption on the island of Hispaniola.
6) The case also demonstrates that the abyss between the rhetoric and realities has grown tremendously under Leonel's regime. Despite many reforms and some changes to the better (for instance macroeconomic stability) under his regime, many realities remain the same. Even though the Cámara de Cuentas (the external auditing agency) has been reformed, gotten more resources, and according to the law is more powerful and autonomous, the case demonstrates clearly that the Cámara neglects its tasks whenever it comes over corruption schemes. It is as impotent as ever. The same is Congress (at least as long as the government holds a majority). A new constitution calling for a new democracy are also empty words as long as the government, the senate and the governing party calls thieving for honesty, and corruption for hard work. The democratic revolution has at the least stumbled in the very start (maybe the government should feel lucky the case isn't tried in the courts, which could have revealed that these have become increasingly politicised under Leonel and in particular after the reshuffling of the Supreme Court, filling of the Constitutional and electoral tribunals). In the end, when considering the new Constitution and new laws regulating the economic dealings of the government, the Bautista case may mean that a) the new laws and constitution is just a show to satisfy voters, international donors, academics, Leonel's ego, etc; b) if the reforms were sincere, the effect of institutions are only skin deep, political culture and legacy is much more important.
7) In the end, like no other case I have seen (and I have followed DR politics closely since 2002), this case and the official reactions it has created, have made abundantly clear that this government has no shame, and that all the fine rhetoric the last eight years have been just that, and nothing more.
I also think that like in no other case, the handling of the Bautista case has disappointed me because it is so obvious that he has stolen other people's money, money that the people who defend him vigorously (the government, the senators) are entrusted to spend wisely for the greater good. For the PLD it is obviously more important to defend one of their own's "right" to steal than to defend their voters' and taxpayers' money.
The Bautista case has been a test of the Dominican democracy which it has failed horrendously.
Showing posts with label DR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DR. Show all posts
Tuesday, 24 April 2012
Monday, 9 April 2012
The War of the Surveys
Semana Santa is over, and the latest bulletin from COE (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia) reports that 40 people died during Easter week this year (16 more than last year). The majority died in traffic accidents, and the majority of dead in traffic accidents are motor cyclists (probably without a helmet). The last day of Semana Santa also brought the first dead of this electoral campaign as fighting turned into gunshots between PLD and PRD supporters during campaigning in Moca. One PRD supporter died and a PLD activist was wounded. During the easter week the candidates had promised not to do any campaigning, so Mejía and Medina went to the USA to campaign there (since campaigning abroad was not mentioned in the Pacto de Civilidad the candidates signed a week before Easter). The major parties' activists, however, campaigned both on Thursday and on Easter Sunday, when traffic in and out of the cities was the highest, creating a lot of extra traffic jams and frustration among people.
Now that Easter is over, the quiet week turns into a noisy last 40 days of electoral campaigning. I am taking a lot of taxis in the capital these days, and most taxistas say that it doesn't matter who wins as long as there only is one round of elections (In fact a political cartoonist from El Día argued today that Jesus Christ's suffering only lasted the Long Friday, while the Dominican people's suffering would last until May 20, ie. election day). A particular feat of the campaigns in the DR is "la guerra de las encuestas", the war of the Surveys, and today I got to experience a little part of that when I went to a press conference organised by Benenson Strategy Group (see also Wikipedia) who wanted to publicise their latest survey. Before I get to that survey, let me briefly display this "war" between the top two candidates.
The bandwagon effect is well known among behaviouralists and within political science and electoral studies. The idea is that people feel better if they support the winner, and that makes some voters vote for the candidate that seems most likely to win the election (independent of what they think of this candidate). The opposite effect would be the underdog effect, but of the two, the bandwagon effect has gotten more attention and seems to be more solidly supported by evidence and studies. The parties in the DR must think that the bandwagon effect is particularly strong here, because both major candidates put great effort into publishing that the surveys put them on top and a sure winner in the first round. Therefore walking the streets of Santo Domingo you can see that part of Danilo Medina's strategy is basically to show that a majority supports him, see for instance this poster (even though the guy you see on the photo in the lower right corner, and his three other friends (not in the photo) playing domino on a street off the Malecón in Santo Domingo on Saturday April 7, all said they supported "Papá", ie. Hipólito Mejía).
Several places in the city you'll see the posters showing that either 52 or 56% prefers Danilo or thinks that Danilo will win the election. Both parties also pay for full page ads in the major newspapers. On Wednesday 4 of April, Danilo reports that all surveys show him as winner in the first round, referring to ASISA's survey of March 27 and 28 which as Medina as winner with 52.8% against Mejía's 45% (others 2.2%), and NEWLINK Research's survey from March 31-April 1, which has the Danilo/Margarita ticket(-s) as winner with 49.1% against Mejía/Abinader with 44%. Today, on April 9, however, Hipólitio Mejía and the PRD retaliated with a full page in El Día, El Nacional, and Hoy (and potentially other newspapers) stating "change is coming" and that the surveys confirm it. Even though Medina said that all surveys point to him as winner, Mejía could present at least four surveys that disagree with Medina. According to Mejía's ad, Bendixen and Amandi's survey from March 23-31 has Mejía as winner with 51.4% against Medina's 39.7%, JZ analytics (31 March) has 49% for Mejía, 44% for Medina, Ana María Acevedo (27-30 March) has Mejía/Abinader with 51.8% and Medina/Cedeño with 44.7%, and Greenberg-Diario Libre has Mejía with 49% and Medina with 46%. My summary of these surveys is just below, and an average of all these surveys (plus the Benenson Strategy group survey) puts Mejía just above Medina with 47.2 against 46.3% (but bear in mind that this includes four surveys used in Mejía adds, two used in Medina adds, and the Benenson survey, which for reasons I deal with below, I am sure will be used in Medina adds soon. This gives Mejía a 4-3 edge in surveys for this average calculation).
So why are the surveys so important? Well, there are reasons to believe that the Bandwagon effect should be strong in the DR, although I have never seen any evidence that substantiates this. First of all, the DR is a clientelistic society and state. Literally thousands of people are promised jobs by the candidates during the campaign, and the candidates will deliver as best as they can if they win office. If you belong to the winner you increase your chances tremendously of getting a "botella", i.e. a state-job won through clientelism, or being put on the nomina which puts you on the payroll without you having to work; and if you are with the loser you are guaranteed not to get either. If you can demonstrate that during the campaign you worked for the winner, you own a party membership card, and so on, you have a shot. The bandwagon effect could be important for everyone trying to decide the last few months and wants to become active in the campaign with the motive of winning a state job. Second, as mentioned in an earlier blog, there are virtually no ideological differences between the two main parties, which both started out on the left, but are now relatively conservative parties. The less ideology means in an election, the more likely it is that voters may be swayed by other motives, such as a bandwagon effect. Third, many do not want a second round and may vote for the likely winner according to the surveys just to avoid a round number 2 (there is a ballotage if no candidate gets 50%+1 vote in the first round), which is likely to enhance a bandwagon effect.
Most of these surveys cannot be taken seriously, and I do not trust any of these now that election day is getting closer. Historically it is Hamilton and Gallup that have produced the most reliable surveys here, but I have not seen any of these doing surveys in March. In February Hamilton reported that Medina had 50% vs. Mejía's 45% (and given the margin of error that is a technical draw). The latest example of a non-trustworthy survey is the one from the respectable US firm Benenson Strategy group. This is a firm that does surveys, but mainly to be used to provide consults to politicians, find political solutions, etc. See their webpage: http://www.bsgco.com. Benenson reports that Juan Manuel Santos, Barack Obama, UK Labour Party and other prominent politicians are and have been their clients. They sell information to politicians and give politicians advice (a bit like accounting firms/consulting firms doing accounting and consulting for the same companies, recent US history demonstrates that this was a bad combination). So Benenson is a serious firm, but normally hired by politicians for (among other things) survey-based advice, which in the DR context makes them unreliable given that potentially the best advice Benenson could give a candidate is to demonstrate strength in surveys, and then produce this survey.
Anyway, today, April 9, at 10 am Benenson called for a press conference at the relatively new hotel Holiday Inn in the posh area of Lincoln Avenue (fun fact is that while Holiday Inn is a moderately priced hotel/motel in the USA, in the DR Holiday Inn is a luxury, business hotel which is more expensive than the luxurious Inter-Continental hotel in Santo Domingo that belongs to the same chain of hotels). As demonstrated in the graph above, Benenson could report 48% for Medina and 40% for Mejía when all candidates were included; asked about the ticket (but excluding other candidates) 51% for Medina/Cedeño vs. 43% for Mejía/Abinader; it was pointed out that Medina/Cedeño was strong among women (55% vs. 37%); that the majority (51%) thinks Medina will win in the first round; that Mejía has the strongest rejection among voters, 39% say they would never vote for Mejía, only 27% say the same about Medina; that 77% say that the election will be decided in the first round and that among these 77%, 57% think that Danilo Medina will win (39% think Mejía would win); and that 54% were more satisfied with the Fernández government (2004-2012), while 43% less satisfied with the Fernández government compared to the Mejía government (2000-2004).
There are many things to say about the presentation of this survey, all of which convinces me that this survey is ordered by PLD, the Medina (and in particular the Cedeño) faction or companies close to the PLD/Medina/Cedeño. But, first I have to declare that since I was not a journalist I did not receive the CD with the background data material that the survey is based on, I only received the print-out of the PPT slides that the Benenson representatives showed at the press-release. Therefore these comments are based on my impression from that press-conference and from the PPT-slides. Even though I am quite confident that this survey is ordered by the PLD, or indirectly by the PLD, this does not mean that the numbers the survey shows are wrong. On that account I can only say that I have no way of knowing whether they are correct or wrong. Second, according to the PPT-slides the survey is based on 1200 respondents, which should make out a reprentative sample, and the margin is +/- 2.83 points.
There are five elements that convince me the PLD is behind this survey: 1) the questions, which all are centered around what seems to be Danilo Medina's message in this campaign; 2) the slides; 3) the presentation of the slides by Benenson; 4) the fact that Benenson would not say who hired them; 5) the type of firm Benenson is.
1) Danilo has centered his message on several key issues, most of which were covered with questions in this survey. Medina focuses on the fact that he shall win the women, and together with Margarita Cedeño he highlights the women's importance, arguing that Margarita gives Danilo a dimension that Abinader does not give Mejía. Second, as mentioned above as well, Medina argues not only that he will win, he will win in the first round, and that he is the candidate that most people think will win (in addition to being the candidate that most people would vote for). Third, Medina and the PLD works as hard as they can to link Mejía (rightfully) to his disastrous rule in 2000-2004, and that is the worst (and most disliked) politician of this century. Fourth, even though Medina offers slogans of "cambio", it is qualified as "cambio seguro", which points out the insecurity of the erratic Mejía. In addition, Medina points out that he will continue that which is good. All of these elements were covered by questions in the survey. The survey's questions thus fits Medina's message quite well, and as such, works to confirm what Medina is arguing day in and day out to the public. The survey first points out that Danilo is more popular than Mejía, then by adding the vice-presidency to the ticket (and by excluding the rest of the candidates), the survey suggests that Margarita brings more to the table than Abinader (Mejía's vice-presidential candidate), which is victory in the first round for Medina. Then it looks at gender-support for the ticket, demonstrating strong female support for Medina/Cedeño, before it builds on Medina's message that people no matter what they vote, think that he will win, and with another question asking the ones who knows who to vote for whether they think it will be decided in the first round and who they think will win (yes, Medina). Finally, supporting Medina's message of "cambio seguro" and continue what is good, it looks at the rejection rate of the candidates and compares Fernández with Medina. The questions (and sum of answers) all fit Medina's message too well.
All of this is done quite well, and are relatively weak circumstantial evidence for my hypothesis. Therefore, I turn the attention to the slides which includes a couple of, maybe, equally weak circumstantial evidence (the reader will have to judge this). First of all, the slides highlights Medina's positive results through headings, everything in the text is written as to underscore the strength of Medina instead of presenting dull, statistical survey results, and to convince us that Medina will win in the first round. Only Medina is mentioned in headings with one exception to highlight Mejía's high rejection percentage. Second, as a consequence of the first point, Mejía's name is almost never mentioned, all is about Medina and Margarita Cedeño, and strangely enough Margarita Cedeño is always mentioned with first and last name, Medina only with first name (is it because she is a woman?, or is there some other reason?). 3) On the gender-based breakdown of support for the candidates, the slide highlights and circles how more women than men support Medina, it does not highlight that more men than women support Mejía. Granted, this difference is smaller, but could have been mentioned. All in all, the slides seem created to convince that Medina is the sure bet, which fits well with a theory that you believe the bandwagon-effect is important.
The presentation in itself also supports, in my view, the tendencies I note above. The oral presentation seemed to aim to convince us Medina would win. But, given the fact that these guys are professional survey analysts, some strange corners were cut in the presentation (and on the slides) that made Medina look better. First is the strange assessment by the presenter (who I think was Giancarlo Sopo, but I am not sure, I arrived a bit late) that when including Cedeño in the question the survey demonstrates Medina would win in the first round (and implying her importance being greater than Abinader's). This is basically a white lie given the fact that this question only asked about preference of the two main tickets Medina/Cedeño and Mejía/Abinader and excluded the smaller parties. Therefore Medina reached the 50% threshold, it was not because Cedeño was added. In fact Benenson's own numbers give Medina a three point increase when adding Cedeño to the question (and excluding all minor parties/candidates), but the same is the result for Mejía/Abinader. Also, the oral presentation highlighted all the positive numbers for Medina/Cedeño and highlighted any negative numbers for Mejía without any caveats. Again, I repeat myself, my impression is that the presentation was made to convince us that Medina would win, not to present dry results.
When asked by a journalist who had commissioned this survey, Benenson answered "a group of private companies" whose identity they could not disclose. This is probably true. A group of companies may have paid for this on a promise of anonymity. For all we know these companies might be owned by Félix Bautista (see my previous blog). However, given this fact, I do not trust the survey. Surveys may be manipulated and I see no valid reason why some companies, whichever they are, should want to hide themselves if they order a survey done. Of the surveys listed above, we know who ordered one of seven. This is the one ordered by Diario Libre, and in my view is the most reliable of the ones I have registered in March (but a source in the PLD tells me that these figures were fixed before published in the Diario Libre...if that is true, I do not know, but what is clear is that Diario Libre did what they could to present Mejía in a positive light in their presentation of that survey, and that on the second day of releasing results from the survey it became clear that Mejía's lead over Medina was somewhat more qualified than what was presented the first day). Given the fact that the DR is a democracy, albeit imperfect, there is no reason to hold back who orders a survey unless you want to hide that it may have been ordered for political reasons (which I believe is the case here).
Finally, Benenson lives of giving advice to politicians and uses surveys to do so. The use of surveys is used to fine-tune politicians' message, not to report results and inform the public. Therefore I am not surprised that the questions fit Medina's message so well (this, however, is no reason for the survey company to cheat with the survey, but many results can be created by the formulation of questions, etc). Benenson in fact brags in their webpages of all the politicians they have worked for (and they are mostly politicians...can the PLD be considered a private company?), why would they suddenly want to keep this a secret now. It could be nice for Benenson to have the PLD and Leonel Fernández as clients. Fernández holds a very good name in Latin America, why not put that on their webpage? I believe this survey is made with the purpose of giving advice to Medina and Cedeño, which is what Benenson does. It is therefore not an objective survey, and I do not trust its results. It may be that the correct figures are presented, or it might be that the correct figures are only presented to the candidates to fine-tune the message, and that Benenson gave advice to "juice" the official stats to win more support. We cannot know. I can basically see no reason for why Benenson would harm their name in producing bad surveys, but then again, they will do what is best for whoever contracts them. If the presented results are false, I presume the candidates have seen the correct results. The only motive for not presenting the correct results must be the fear of not getting a contract renewal for another survey if the results are bad for the candidate. But, as mentioned, I have not seen the data material and cannot say anything about the veracity of the results presented. What I do think I have argued well for is that Benenson's message seemed like ordered by the PLD: The questions, the slides and the presentation fit Medina's message extremely well, they seem created to convince the public that Medina is a sure bet, and therefore seem biased and non-trustworthy.
I must finally add that this long story of a survey which I think is paid for by the PLD or companies that support the PLD, is only one of probably many such examples in this (and previous) campaigns. I will probably not write extensively about other politicised surveys, but I want to add that this could just as well have been a story about a survey ordered by the PRD. I happened to write about this one since I had the opportunity to go to this press-conference.
Now that Easter is over, the quiet week turns into a noisy last 40 days of electoral campaigning. I am taking a lot of taxis in the capital these days, and most taxistas say that it doesn't matter who wins as long as there only is one round of elections (In fact a political cartoonist from El Día argued today that Jesus Christ's suffering only lasted the Long Friday, while the Dominican people's suffering would last until May 20, ie. election day). A particular feat of the campaigns in the DR is "la guerra de las encuestas", the war of the Surveys, and today I got to experience a little part of that when I went to a press conference organised by Benenson Strategy Group (see also Wikipedia) who wanted to publicise their latest survey. Before I get to that survey, let me briefly display this "war" between the top two candidates.
The bandwagon effect is well known among behaviouralists and within political science and electoral studies. The idea is that people feel better if they support the winner, and that makes some voters vote for the candidate that seems most likely to win the election (independent of what they think of this candidate). The opposite effect would be the underdog effect, but of the two, the bandwagon effect has gotten more attention and seems to be more solidly supported by evidence and studies. The parties in the DR must think that the bandwagon effect is particularly strong here, because both major candidates put great effort into publishing that the surveys put them on top and a sure winner in the first round. Therefore walking the streets of Santo Domingo you can see that part of Danilo Medina's strategy is basically to show that a majority supports him, see for instance this poster (even though the guy you see on the photo in the lower right corner, and his three other friends (not in the photo) playing domino on a street off the Malecón in Santo Domingo on Saturday April 7, all said they supported "Papá", ie. Hipólito Mejía).
Several places in the city you'll see the posters showing that either 52 or 56% prefers Danilo or thinks that Danilo will win the election. Both parties also pay for full page ads in the major newspapers. On Wednesday 4 of April, Danilo reports that all surveys show him as winner in the first round, referring to ASISA's survey of March 27 and 28 which as Medina as winner with 52.8% against Mejía's 45% (others 2.2%), and NEWLINK Research's survey from March 31-April 1, which has the Danilo/Margarita ticket(-s) as winner with 49.1% against Mejía/Abinader with 44%. Today, on April 9, however, Hipólitio Mejía and the PRD retaliated with a full page in El Día, El Nacional, and Hoy (and potentially other newspapers) stating "change is coming" and that the surveys confirm it. Even though Medina said that all surveys point to him as winner, Mejía could present at least four surveys that disagree with Medina. According to Mejía's ad, Bendixen and Amandi's survey from March 23-31 has Mejía as winner with 51.4% against Medina's 39.7%, JZ analytics (31 March) has 49% for Mejía, 44% for Medina, Ana María Acevedo (27-30 March) has Mejía/Abinader with 51.8% and Medina/Cedeño with 44.7%, and Greenberg-Diario Libre has Mejía with 49% and Medina with 46%. My summary of these surveys is just below, and an average of all these surveys (plus the Benenson Strategy group survey) puts Mejía just above Medina with 47.2 against 46.3% (but bear in mind that this includes four surveys used in Mejía adds, two used in Medina adds, and the Benenson survey, which for reasons I deal with below, I am sure will be used in Medina adds soon. This gives Mejía a 4-3 edge in surveys for this average calculation).
So why are the surveys so important? Well, there are reasons to believe that the Bandwagon effect should be strong in the DR, although I have never seen any evidence that substantiates this. First of all, the DR is a clientelistic society and state. Literally thousands of people are promised jobs by the candidates during the campaign, and the candidates will deliver as best as they can if they win office. If you belong to the winner you increase your chances tremendously of getting a "botella", i.e. a state-job won through clientelism, or being put on the nomina which puts you on the payroll without you having to work; and if you are with the loser you are guaranteed not to get either. If you can demonstrate that during the campaign you worked for the winner, you own a party membership card, and so on, you have a shot. The bandwagon effect could be important for everyone trying to decide the last few months and wants to become active in the campaign with the motive of winning a state job. Second, as mentioned in an earlier blog, there are virtually no ideological differences between the two main parties, which both started out on the left, but are now relatively conservative parties. The less ideology means in an election, the more likely it is that voters may be swayed by other motives, such as a bandwagon effect. Third, many do not want a second round and may vote for the likely winner according to the surveys just to avoid a round number 2 (there is a ballotage if no candidate gets 50%+1 vote in the first round), which is likely to enhance a bandwagon effect.
Most of these surveys cannot be taken seriously, and I do not trust any of these now that election day is getting closer. Historically it is Hamilton and Gallup that have produced the most reliable surveys here, but I have not seen any of these doing surveys in March. In February Hamilton reported that Medina had 50% vs. Mejía's 45% (and given the margin of error that is a technical draw). The latest example of a non-trustworthy survey is the one from the respectable US firm Benenson Strategy group. This is a firm that does surveys, but mainly to be used to provide consults to politicians, find political solutions, etc. See their webpage: http://www.bsgco.com. Benenson reports that Juan Manuel Santos, Barack Obama, UK Labour Party and other prominent politicians are and have been their clients. They sell information to politicians and give politicians advice (a bit like accounting firms/consulting firms doing accounting and consulting for the same companies, recent US history demonstrates that this was a bad combination). So Benenson is a serious firm, but normally hired by politicians for (among other things) survey-based advice, which in the DR context makes them unreliable given that potentially the best advice Benenson could give a candidate is to demonstrate strength in surveys, and then produce this survey.
Anyway, today, April 9, at 10 am Benenson called for a press conference at the relatively new hotel Holiday Inn in the posh area of Lincoln Avenue (fun fact is that while Holiday Inn is a moderately priced hotel/motel in the USA, in the DR Holiday Inn is a luxury, business hotel which is more expensive than the luxurious Inter-Continental hotel in Santo Domingo that belongs to the same chain of hotels). As demonstrated in the graph above, Benenson could report 48% for Medina and 40% for Mejía when all candidates were included; asked about the ticket (but excluding other candidates) 51% for Medina/Cedeño vs. 43% for Mejía/Abinader; it was pointed out that Medina/Cedeño was strong among women (55% vs. 37%); that the majority (51%) thinks Medina will win in the first round; that Mejía has the strongest rejection among voters, 39% say they would never vote for Mejía, only 27% say the same about Medina; that 77% say that the election will be decided in the first round and that among these 77%, 57% think that Danilo Medina will win (39% think Mejía would win); and that 54% were more satisfied with the Fernández government (2004-2012), while 43% less satisfied with the Fernández government compared to the Mejía government (2000-2004).
There are many things to say about the presentation of this survey, all of which convinces me that this survey is ordered by PLD, the Medina (and in particular the Cedeño) faction or companies close to the PLD/Medina/Cedeño. But, first I have to declare that since I was not a journalist I did not receive the CD with the background data material that the survey is based on, I only received the print-out of the PPT slides that the Benenson representatives showed at the press-release. Therefore these comments are based on my impression from that press-conference and from the PPT-slides. Even though I am quite confident that this survey is ordered by the PLD, or indirectly by the PLD, this does not mean that the numbers the survey shows are wrong. On that account I can only say that I have no way of knowing whether they are correct or wrong. Second, according to the PPT-slides the survey is based on 1200 respondents, which should make out a reprentative sample, and the margin is +/- 2.83 points.
There are five elements that convince me the PLD is behind this survey: 1) the questions, which all are centered around what seems to be Danilo Medina's message in this campaign; 2) the slides; 3) the presentation of the slides by Benenson; 4) the fact that Benenson would not say who hired them; 5) the type of firm Benenson is.
1) Danilo has centered his message on several key issues, most of which were covered with questions in this survey. Medina focuses on the fact that he shall win the women, and together with Margarita Cedeño he highlights the women's importance, arguing that Margarita gives Danilo a dimension that Abinader does not give Mejía. Second, as mentioned above as well, Medina argues not only that he will win, he will win in the first round, and that he is the candidate that most people think will win (in addition to being the candidate that most people would vote for). Third, Medina and the PLD works as hard as they can to link Mejía (rightfully) to his disastrous rule in 2000-2004, and that is the worst (and most disliked) politician of this century. Fourth, even though Medina offers slogans of "cambio", it is qualified as "cambio seguro", which points out the insecurity of the erratic Mejía. In addition, Medina points out that he will continue that which is good. All of these elements were covered by questions in the survey. The survey's questions thus fits Medina's message quite well, and as such, works to confirm what Medina is arguing day in and day out to the public. The survey first points out that Danilo is more popular than Mejía, then by adding the vice-presidency to the ticket (and by excluding the rest of the candidates), the survey suggests that Margarita brings more to the table than Abinader (Mejía's vice-presidential candidate), which is victory in the first round for Medina. Then it looks at gender-support for the ticket, demonstrating strong female support for Medina/Cedeño, before it builds on Medina's message that people no matter what they vote, think that he will win, and with another question asking the ones who knows who to vote for whether they think it will be decided in the first round and who they think will win (yes, Medina). Finally, supporting Medina's message of "cambio seguro" and continue what is good, it looks at the rejection rate of the candidates and compares Fernández with Medina. The questions (and sum of answers) all fit Medina's message too well.
All of this is done quite well, and are relatively weak circumstantial evidence for my hypothesis. Therefore, I turn the attention to the slides which includes a couple of, maybe, equally weak circumstantial evidence (the reader will have to judge this). First of all, the slides highlights Medina's positive results through headings, everything in the text is written as to underscore the strength of Medina instead of presenting dull, statistical survey results, and to convince us that Medina will win in the first round. Only Medina is mentioned in headings with one exception to highlight Mejía's high rejection percentage. Second, as a consequence of the first point, Mejía's name is almost never mentioned, all is about Medina and Margarita Cedeño, and strangely enough Margarita Cedeño is always mentioned with first and last name, Medina only with first name (is it because she is a woman?, or is there some other reason?). 3) On the gender-based breakdown of support for the candidates, the slide highlights and circles how more women than men support Medina, it does not highlight that more men than women support Mejía. Granted, this difference is smaller, but could have been mentioned. All in all, the slides seem created to convince that Medina is the sure bet, which fits well with a theory that you believe the bandwagon-effect is important.
The presentation in itself also supports, in my view, the tendencies I note above. The oral presentation seemed to aim to convince us Medina would win. But, given the fact that these guys are professional survey analysts, some strange corners were cut in the presentation (and on the slides) that made Medina look better. First is the strange assessment by the presenter (who I think was Giancarlo Sopo, but I am not sure, I arrived a bit late) that when including Cedeño in the question the survey demonstrates Medina would win in the first round (and implying her importance being greater than Abinader's). This is basically a white lie given the fact that this question only asked about preference of the two main tickets Medina/Cedeño and Mejía/Abinader and excluded the smaller parties. Therefore Medina reached the 50% threshold, it was not because Cedeño was added. In fact Benenson's own numbers give Medina a three point increase when adding Cedeño to the question (and excluding all minor parties/candidates), but the same is the result for Mejía/Abinader. Also, the oral presentation highlighted all the positive numbers for Medina/Cedeño and highlighted any negative numbers for Mejía without any caveats. Again, I repeat myself, my impression is that the presentation was made to convince us that Medina would win, not to present dry results.
When asked by a journalist who had commissioned this survey, Benenson answered "a group of private companies" whose identity they could not disclose. This is probably true. A group of companies may have paid for this on a promise of anonymity. For all we know these companies might be owned by Félix Bautista (see my previous blog). However, given this fact, I do not trust the survey. Surveys may be manipulated and I see no valid reason why some companies, whichever they are, should want to hide themselves if they order a survey done. Of the surveys listed above, we know who ordered one of seven. This is the one ordered by Diario Libre, and in my view is the most reliable of the ones I have registered in March (but a source in the PLD tells me that these figures were fixed before published in the Diario Libre...if that is true, I do not know, but what is clear is that Diario Libre did what they could to present Mejía in a positive light in their presentation of that survey, and that on the second day of releasing results from the survey it became clear that Mejía's lead over Medina was somewhat more qualified than what was presented the first day). Given the fact that the DR is a democracy, albeit imperfect, there is no reason to hold back who orders a survey unless you want to hide that it may have been ordered for political reasons (which I believe is the case here).
Finally, Benenson lives of giving advice to politicians and uses surveys to do so. The use of surveys is used to fine-tune politicians' message, not to report results and inform the public. Therefore I am not surprised that the questions fit Medina's message so well (this, however, is no reason for the survey company to cheat with the survey, but many results can be created by the formulation of questions, etc). Benenson in fact brags in their webpages of all the politicians they have worked for (and they are mostly politicians...can the PLD be considered a private company?), why would they suddenly want to keep this a secret now. It could be nice for Benenson to have the PLD and Leonel Fernández as clients. Fernández holds a very good name in Latin America, why not put that on their webpage? I believe this survey is made with the purpose of giving advice to Medina and Cedeño, which is what Benenson does. It is therefore not an objective survey, and I do not trust its results. It may be that the correct figures are presented, or it might be that the correct figures are only presented to the candidates to fine-tune the message, and that Benenson gave advice to "juice" the official stats to win more support. We cannot know. I can basically see no reason for why Benenson would harm their name in producing bad surveys, but then again, they will do what is best for whoever contracts them. If the presented results are false, I presume the candidates have seen the correct results. The only motive for not presenting the correct results must be the fear of not getting a contract renewal for another survey if the results are bad for the candidate. But, as mentioned, I have not seen the data material and cannot say anything about the veracity of the results presented. What I do think I have argued well for is that Benenson's message seemed like ordered by the PLD: The questions, the slides and the presentation fit Medina's message extremely well, they seem created to convince the public that Medina is a sure bet, and therefore seem biased and non-trustworthy.
I must finally add that this long story of a survey which I think is paid for by the PLD or companies that support the PLD, is only one of probably many such examples in this (and previous) campaigns. I will probably not write extensively about other politicised surveys, but I want to add that this could just as well have been a story about a survey ordered by the PRD. I happened to write about this one since I had the opportunity to go to this press-conference.
Monday, 26 March 2012
Monday March 26...in Santo Domingo
Some of the posts I put out will be more of a diary type and shortly summarise some of the last events of the elections and politics more in general. This is one of these posts.
Yesterday was an important date for the elections since the Junta Central Electoral (www.jce.do) officially accepted the candidacies for president and vice president, and started verifying the electoral roll (census of registered voters). PLD runs with Danilo Medina and Margarita Cedeño, PRD with Hipólito Mejía and Luis Abinader, and PRSC will not have a proper candidate but supports officially Danilo Medina (you can actually vote for Medina on a PRSC ticket on May 20). There are four more groups of candidates from minor parties (if parties is the proper name for any of the political parties in the country right now): Eduardo Estrella for DxC (Dominicanos por el Cambio), Estrella from Cibao was presidential candidate for the PRSC in 2004, in 2008 he ran as presidential candidate for PRSD (Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata, Hatuey DeCamps splinter party from the PRD...interestingly after a deal PRSD will this year support Mejía and the PRD and DeCamps has become one of Mejía's campaign managers...evil tongues have it that DeCamps does this only to bury Mejía as a revenge against Mejía running for re-election in 2004). This is therefore Estrella's third bid for the presidency, for his third party, in eight years. Max Puig is the presidential candidate for Alianza por la democracia, APD, a party he founded when he officially left the PLD. Puig was as recently as 2004 named environmental minister by Fernández, and until recently his party has supported and allied with the PLD. The real "independent candidate" this year, and one who might be popular with the middle classes who are tired of the same old from the established parties, is Guillermo Moreno for the party Alianza País. Moreno is a lawyer, a popular education among Dominican politicians and he has earlier worked as an academic, lawyer and as prosecutor general in Santo Domingo. Earlier he has represented MIUCA (Movimiento Independencia Unidad y Cambio), which used to play the role as the intelectual alternative to the major parties but this year supports Julian Serrulle (see below). If Moreno can capture enough votes of the people who are "jarto", then there might be a second round in the presidential elections. The last candidate is Julian Serrulle for the Frente Amplio party. Serrulle comes from a well-known political family as well and just as Max Puig he considered himself close to Juan Bosch, and the PLD. In sum we have the two main candidates, two independent candidates that come out of the PLD, one from the PRSC and one which has very little history with the main parties.
JCE also started revising the electoral roll, which means checking that all with a right to vote is registered as a voter and registered at a polling station that enables voting. Historically, the electoral roll (padrón electoral) has been the source of electoral fraud in the country, most famously in 1994 with the displacement of up to 300.000 voters, but this year I do not think one should expect any greater problems. The OAS has been present to oversee the revision, but the PRD (just to be sure) is on top of the process and is complaining that their voters (in particular) may be displaced. There has been a few reasons for concern regarding the Center for computing in the JCE, partly because both in the Center and the JCE key members are considered to be too closely associated with the PLD. Since this promises to be a close election, such concerns should be taken seriously.
On another note, today Diario Libre ran a story that nicely demonstrates the workings of a clientelistic state. The DR political culture and regime must be caracterised as clientelistic, and Hartlyn in his 1998 book called the regime neopatrimonial. This is a description that still fits today. Diario Libre could report that 80% of the vice-ministers (sub-secretary of state) are inorganic, which means that they are not nominated by law. It also means that these do not do any work for the state, they only receive a salary. Most of these do not even have an office. In total Diario Libre found that only 36 vice-ministers are nominated according to the law and potentially do any real work for the government. 154 vice-ministers are not nominated according to the law and probably do not do anything for the government, except receive a salary, potentially a car and maybe some funds for private security, etc. There are 20 ministries in the country, so the total sum of 190 vice-ministers is quite high. The PRD economist, or economist with a known affiliation with the PRD, Andrés Dauhajre Jr. came to an even higher figure last year. He argues that there are 334 vice-ministers in the country. The actual minister of Public Administration, Ramón Ventura, reports that his ministry has produced regulations of the nomination of vice-ministers, and he has given his colleagues until June to remove any superfluous vice-ministers. My guess is that this regulation will not be respected and that things will continue like they are even after the elections. The reason is that vice-ministries are currency for alliances (together with among other things the presidency of the Liga Municipal Dominicana), and these are as important as ever given that ideological differences are almost non-existent between the main parties (this is confirmed by the Elite surveys done by the Universidad de Salamanca). Supporting the two top candidates are for the PLD: PRSC, BIS (former Peña Gómez, PRD, faction), UDC (Unión Demócrata Cristiana), Partido Quiqueyano Demócrata Cristiano, FNP (Fuerza Nacional Progresista), Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos (PTD), Partido Popular Cristiano, Partido Demócrata Popular, Partido Cívico Renovador, Partido Liberal de la República Dominicana, Partido de Acción Liberal (PAL), Partido Socialista Verde and Partido de la Unidad Nacional. Supporting the PRD we find the former splinter party PRSD, Partido Demócrata Institucional, Partido Movimiento Democrático Alternativo, Partido Humanista Dominicano and Partio Alianza Social Dominicana. All in all 18 parties, which are not really parties, but entities of electoral accountability that helps the main party keep scores of how many votes the minor parties contributed with in their victory. From that score, once in government, a president may start paying out. And, they pay out with vice-ministries.
A last funny note was a letter of opinion written in Hoy on March 23 by Ramón Arturo Guerrero, which compared Leonel Fernández with President-elect Putin of Russia. I expected a nice story about how Medina would be for Leonel what Medvedev was to Putin, but no. It was a piece comparing their backgrounds growing up in authoritarian systems, education, etc. and which compared their popularity. Both leaders, Guerrero argued, implemented democracy in their respective countries and ruled with high quality. Guerrero concludes that Fernández as Putin, could come back in 2016 (and for some reason be re-elected in 2020, apparently Guerrero assumes that someone will reform the constitution again and open for immediate presidential re-election, again). Although I am critical to President Fernández's work as president, I must say that he strikes as somewhat more democratic than Putin. Guerrero, who obviously is a Fernández supporter, did not make a very flattering comparison for his president.
Yesterday was an important date for the elections since the Junta Central Electoral (www.jce.do) officially accepted the candidacies for president and vice president, and started verifying the electoral roll (census of registered voters). PLD runs with Danilo Medina and Margarita Cedeño, PRD with Hipólito Mejía and Luis Abinader, and PRSC will not have a proper candidate but supports officially Danilo Medina (you can actually vote for Medina on a PRSC ticket on May 20). There are four more groups of candidates from minor parties (if parties is the proper name for any of the political parties in the country right now): Eduardo Estrella for DxC (Dominicanos por el Cambio), Estrella from Cibao was presidential candidate for the PRSC in 2004, in 2008 he ran as presidential candidate for PRSD (Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata, Hatuey DeCamps splinter party from the PRD...interestingly after a deal PRSD will this year support Mejía and the PRD and DeCamps has become one of Mejía's campaign managers...evil tongues have it that DeCamps does this only to bury Mejía as a revenge against Mejía running for re-election in 2004). This is therefore Estrella's third bid for the presidency, for his third party, in eight years. Max Puig is the presidential candidate for Alianza por la democracia, APD, a party he founded when he officially left the PLD. Puig was as recently as 2004 named environmental minister by Fernández, and until recently his party has supported and allied with the PLD. The real "independent candidate" this year, and one who might be popular with the middle classes who are tired of the same old from the established parties, is Guillermo Moreno for the party Alianza País. Moreno is a lawyer, a popular education among Dominican politicians and he has earlier worked as an academic, lawyer and as prosecutor general in Santo Domingo. Earlier he has represented MIUCA (Movimiento Independencia Unidad y Cambio), which used to play the role as the intelectual alternative to the major parties but this year supports Julian Serrulle (see below). If Moreno can capture enough votes of the people who are "jarto", then there might be a second round in the presidential elections. The last candidate is Julian Serrulle for the Frente Amplio party. Serrulle comes from a well-known political family as well and just as Max Puig he considered himself close to Juan Bosch, and the PLD. In sum we have the two main candidates, two independent candidates that come out of the PLD, one from the PRSC and one which has very little history with the main parties.
JCE also started revising the electoral roll, which means checking that all with a right to vote is registered as a voter and registered at a polling station that enables voting. Historically, the electoral roll (padrón electoral) has been the source of electoral fraud in the country, most famously in 1994 with the displacement of up to 300.000 voters, but this year I do not think one should expect any greater problems. The OAS has been present to oversee the revision, but the PRD (just to be sure) is on top of the process and is complaining that their voters (in particular) may be displaced. There has been a few reasons for concern regarding the Center for computing in the JCE, partly because both in the Center and the JCE key members are considered to be too closely associated with the PLD. Since this promises to be a close election, such concerns should be taken seriously.
On another note, today Diario Libre ran a story that nicely demonstrates the workings of a clientelistic state. The DR political culture and regime must be caracterised as clientelistic, and Hartlyn in his 1998 book called the regime neopatrimonial. This is a description that still fits today. Diario Libre could report that 80% of the vice-ministers (sub-secretary of state) are inorganic, which means that they are not nominated by law. It also means that these do not do any work for the state, they only receive a salary. Most of these do not even have an office. In total Diario Libre found that only 36 vice-ministers are nominated according to the law and potentially do any real work for the government. 154 vice-ministers are not nominated according to the law and probably do not do anything for the government, except receive a salary, potentially a car and maybe some funds for private security, etc. There are 20 ministries in the country, so the total sum of 190 vice-ministers is quite high. The PRD economist, or economist with a known affiliation with the PRD, Andrés Dauhajre Jr. came to an even higher figure last year. He argues that there are 334 vice-ministers in the country. The actual minister of Public Administration, Ramón Ventura, reports that his ministry has produced regulations of the nomination of vice-ministers, and he has given his colleagues until June to remove any superfluous vice-ministers. My guess is that this regulation will not be respected and that things will continue like they are even after the elections. The reason is that vice-ministries are currency for alliances (together with among other things the presidency of the Liga Municipal Dominicana), and these are as important as ever given that ideological differences are almost non-existent between the main parties (this is confirmed by the Elite surveys done by the Universidad de Salamanca). Supporting the two top candidates are for the PLD: PRSC, BIS (former Peña Gómez, PRD, faction), UDC (Unión Demócrata Cristiana), Partido Quiqueyano Demócrata Cristiano, FNP (Fuerza Nacional Progresista), Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos (PTD), Partido Popular Cristiano, Partido Demócrata Popular, Partido Cívico Renovador, Partido Liberal de la República Dominicana, Partido de Acción Liberal (PAL), Partido Socialista Verde and Partido de la Unidad Nacional. Supporting the PRD we find the former splinter party PRSD, Partido Demócrata Institucional, Partido Movimiento Democrático Alternativo, Partido Humanista Dominicano and Partio Alianza Social Dominicana. All in all 18 parties, which are not really parties, but entities of electoral accountability that helps the main party keep scores of how many votes the minor parties contributed with in their victory. From that score, once in government, a president may start paying out. And, they pay out with vice-ministries.
A last funny note was a letter of opinion written in Hoy on March 23 by Ramón Arturo Guerrero, which compared Leonel Fernández with President-elect Putin of Russia. I expected a nice story about how Medina would be for Leonel what Medvedev was to Putin, but no. It was a piece comparing their backgrounds growing up in authoritarian systems, education, etc. and which compared their popularity. Both leaders, Guerrero argued, implemented democracy in their respective countries and ruled with high quality. Guerrero concludes that Fernández as Putin, could come back in 2016 (and for some reason be re-elected in 2020, apparently Guerrero assumes that someone will reform the constitution again and open for immediate presidential re-election, again). Although I am critical to President Fernández's work as president, I must say that he strikes as somewhat more democratic than Putin. Guerrero, who obviously is a Fernández supporter, did not make a very flattering comparison for his president.
Sunday, 25 March 2012
The battle over education in the DR
(One has to be careful when using blogger on Iphone...I accidentally deleted this blog from March 25, and repost it now)
A bit more than a year ago, the DR suddenlyexperienced one of its first modern collective, civil-society mobilisations,and it articulated demands for better quality in the education system in thecountry. The protests hit President Leonel Fernández quite hard and the size,level of uproar and level of mobilisation was a surprise, I think, both to thegovernment and everyone else.
To almost everyone's disappointment, Leonel presented a budget for 2011 (andlater for 2012) that did not increase the funds for education, and Congress passed a law that basically gave President Fernández the right to violate the 66/97 education law and spend less than that law stipulated on education. Leonel thus presenteda budget that maintained funding for education stable at about 1.8% of GDP. Theprotests, however, together with an internal dissent in the PLD led Congress toincrease funds for education about 4,000 million DOP, which could beinterpreted as a victory (albeit a small one) for the opposition and the 4%group. This of course was old news until FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales) and others decided to follow up the government's effort ineducation. A recent report by FLACSO picked up by Diario Libre, Hoy and othernews media, demonstrated that the ministry of education spent 6,788 million DOPless than budgeted by congress. The ministry thus spent less than theadministration had originally proposed in the budget. In fact the ministryspent only about 85% of what was budgeted after Congress's increase of about4,000 million DOP. The renowned journalist Juan Bolívar Díaz called it "Otra burla a la voluntad popular" in the newspaper Hoy on Sunday, March 25.
A bit more than a year ago, the DR suddenlyexperienced one of its first modern collective, civil-society mobilisations,and it articulated demands for better quality in the education system in thecountry. The protests hit President Leonel Fernández quite hard and the size,level of uproar and level of mobilisation was a surprise, I think, both to thegovernment and everyone else.
The demands were for the government to comply with law 66/97 that stipulates that the education ministry shouldreceive funds equivalent to 4% of the country's GDP. The law was passed duringLeonel's first government, but with the votes also from the opposition (PRD).Anyway, since 1997 the governments have never met this target, and the fundsgiven to education has lingered between 1.5-1.8% of GDP since 1998. Obviously,all three Fernández administrations and the Mejía administration violated theeducation law.
Last year groups mainly from the middleclass organised rather spontaneously and using new social networks to demandthat the government comply with the law of education and spend 4% of GDP oneducation. The group used yellow as its colour and the message was simple (as it was unrealistic): Idemand 4%. Leonel's nice rhetoric finally met with the hard realities and thetwo did not match up. The organisers of the 4% actions were so succesful thatthe government became rather desperate. Suddenly people wearing yellow t-shirts were denied access to the cathedral, national monuments and other publicplaces. (the serious) Parts of Leonel's own party started demanding that forthe 2011 budget the President should correct former wrongs and add more fundsto education. The opposition of course was also demanding (suddenly) more fundsfor education, even though in all previous years the PRD and PRSC had remainedrelatively silent on the subject. The whole debacle was an interestingdemonstration of civil society mobilisation moving setting the agenda andcreating sufficient momentum to actually achieve positive results. I wasactually quite impressed since this does not occur frequently in the DR (exceptfor taxi drivers and transporters' strikes which generally achieve their goals).
To almost everyone's disappointment, Leonel presented a budget for 2011 (andlater for 2012) that did not increase the funds for education, and Congress passed a law that basically gave President Fernández the right to violate the 66/97 education law and spend less than that law stipulated on education. Leonel thus presenteda budget that maintained funding for education stable at about 1.8% of GDP. Theprotests, however, together with an internal dissent in the PLD led Congress toincrease funds for education about 4,000 million DOP, which could beinterpreted as a victory (albeit a small one) for the opposition and the 4%group. This of course was old news until FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales) and others decided to follow up the government's effort ineducation. A recent report by FLACSO picked up by Diario Libre, Hoy and othernews media, demonstrated that the ministry of education spent 6,788 million DOPless than budgeted by congress. The ministry thus spent less than theadministration had originally proposed in the budget. In fact the ministryspent only about 85% of what was budgeted after Congress's increase of about4,000 million DOP. The renowned journalist Juan Bolívar Díaz called it "Otra burla a la voluntad popular" in the newspaper Hoy on Sunday, March 25.
This news has come back to haunt the PLDgovernment led by Leonel Fernández, himself an educated, and intellectual,president, who one would think, believing in his speeches, would supporteducation. The story became big news both in Diario Libre, Acento and Hoy. My research, however, demonstrates that the recent negligence ineducation, and the recent under-spending, is not new, but rather follows up along-held legacy since Balaguer's 12 años (1966-1978) (for more, see for instance my Master's thesis and my article in ALH.
The graph above shows spending compared to passed budget in the ministry of education from 1966-2009 (data based on official proposed budget and executed budget). Basically the graph demonstrates that it is quite normal that DR administrations spend less money on education than what is originally budgeted. In fact from 1966-2009, on average only 87% of the budget was spent by the ministry of education. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the ministry of education only managed to spend 85% of its budgeted funds in 2011. The graph, however, also demonstrates that the trend is that governments in the DR are improving. Starting out at about 80% of spent allocations, the ministry of education today is spending on average more than 90% of its funds. This indeed, is a positive development, even though it has taken more than forty years...
But, how much do Dominican governments spend on education? Generally the country score extremely low in Latin American comparisons. The following graph tracks the percentage of all budget expenses that goes to education in the same 1966-2009 period.
Now, beware that this is percentage of all budget expenses, not percentage of GDP which the big 4% debate is about. The graph demonstrates first that as share of all budget expenses became less important as the Balaguer administrations (1966-1978, 1986-1990) progressed, and that education received its lowest share of the budget during the Balaguer regimes. Furthermore, the administrations that took over after Balaguer (PRD 1978, PLD in 1996) increased drastically education's share of total budget expenses. However, under both PRD's first and second stint in power (1992-86, 2000-04), education lost importance with time, in both periods maybe due to the on-going economic hardship that hit the PRD administrations. After Mejía left power in 2004, Fernández's administrations did not increase spending to education, and the budgets have stabilised about 8-10% of all budget expenses. But, how much do Dominican governments spend on education? Generally the country score extremely low in Latin American comparisons. The following graph tracks the percentage of all budget expenses that goes to education in the same 1966-2009 period.
What can we conclude: All administrations do not pay sufficient attention to education in the DR, all administration tend to give less money than budgeted to education, a fact that makes matters worse, and all administrations since 1997 have broken the law (and some might say the constitution). There is therefore good reasons to be sceptical towards the candidates' promises of 4% to education. Regardless of this it is also important that the well-intentioned groups fighting for the 4% target accept compromises along the road since doubling the education ministry's budget would not bevery fruitful. The education ministry would probably not know how to tackle so much funds and it would only open up for more corruption. What one could hope for is stable increases in the budget share for education so that in maybe 10 years the country might reach the target established by law. The great disappointment for the Dominicans should be that this development never started in 1998.
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